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The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When
They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Abstract

In the spring of 2010, the Hamline Law Review hosted a symposium to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the
adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. This article was written for the symposium and provides an
exhaustive and detailed account of the historical context and drafting history of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(the UTSA).
Among other stories that it tells, the article explains that the UTSA was prompted by the “Erie/Sears/
Compco squeeze.” Because of the Supreme Court’s famous decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins in 1938, it
was understood by business interests and their attorneys that the common law development of unfair
competition law would have to occur at the state level. However, when the Supreme Court rendered its
decisions in the Sears/Compco cases in 1964, the development of unfair competition law at the state level
came to a screeching halt. This led to various efforts to fill-the-gap, including a number of proposals for a
federal unfair competition law that, in some iterations, included a prohibition on trade secret
misappropriation.
As detailed in the article, another impetus behind the development of the UTSA was the business
community’s dissatisfaction with the pace of development and features of the common law of trade secrecy.
Importantly, concern was expressed about the risks that trade secret rights would be over-asserted in ways that
would unduly quell competition. Thus, care was taken to define trade secrets and available injunctive relief in
ways that limit the scope of trade secret protection. In this regard, the drafters of the UTSA were guided by the
Supreme Court's decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. which counsels against broad trade secret
protection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
All laws evolve. Typically, in the case of tort law, the development
of the law begins with the commission of a perceived wrong that leads
someone to file a lawsuit alleging harm, followed by the decision of society
(often through the agency of courts) to provide one or more remedies. As
anyone who has studied the development of the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress can attest, although an individual may be hurt by the
wrongdoing of another, it often takes decades for a cause of action to be
recognized by courts or codified in a statute.' Then, even when one or more
states recognize a cause of action for the alleged wrongdoing, other states
may be slow to follow their lead or may reject the new cause of action
altogether.2 Among those states that are willing to recognize a new tort, the
parameters of the cause of action (including applicable defenses) may be
defined so that the availability of relief is narrowly circumscribed. To the
chagrin of business interests, sometimes new torts are defined too broadly or
imprecisely so that it is difficult to determine where potential liability begins
and ends.
In theory, the fits and starts and ebbs and flows of the evolutionary
process of the law reflect societal values. Although it has been said, "for
every wrong, there is a remedy," there are differing perceptions about what
See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, Topic C, NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
DISTRESS (West 2001) (providing a brief history of the development of the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress).
2
See, e.g., Kevin E. Bry, Genuinely Distressing: Illinois' Failure to Allow a
Cause of Action for Emotional Injuries Caused By Negligent Mishandling of a Corpse, 23 J.
MARSHALL LA. REv. 353 (1990) (discussing limits that the courts of Illinois placed on a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Joseph Matye, Bystander Recovery for
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Missouri, 60 UMKC LAW REv. 169 (1991)
(discussing the reluctance of Missouri Courts to recognize a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress suffered by a bystander). Cf Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64
N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (providing an example of the slow reception of a new tort by
demonstrating that New York courts refused to recognize a claim for invasion of privacy
under common law following the publication of Samuel Warren and William Brandeis, The
Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890)); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 582 N.W. 2d
231 (Minn. 1998) (demonstrating that Minnesota only recognized three of the four privacy
torts in 1998, more than 100 years after Warren's and Brandeis's famous article); but cf
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (G.A. 1905) (demonstrating that
other states, such as Georgia, recognized claims for invasion of privacy).
I

EMOTIONAL
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constitutes cognizable wrongdoing and cognizable harm, and these
perceptions can change over time.3 Generally, courts and legislatures have
been reticent to recognize new causes of action merely because someone or
some interest was harmed in some way.4 In addition, they usually require
that the acts of the defendant be deemed blameworthy or, in the case of noncontract based causes of action, "tortious."5 For the injured plaintiff who is
denied a remedy, this may seem like a cruel result but, in theory, it reflects a
balancing of competing interests. As a society, we cannot afford to give
everyone who suffers from the slings and arrows of life relief in a court of
law. Even where a cause of action is created, we often limit its reach to
accommodate other societal interests that are deemed more important.
The law of unfair competition, of which trade secret law is a part,
has evolved like other principles of tort law. In its early incarnations,
businessmen complained of various activities by competitors that caused
them harm. Their first challenge was to articulate some behavior by the
defendant that was blameworthy and resulting harm that common law or
equity courts deemed deserving of relief. When a plaintiffs complaints
focused on the consequences of competition, judges were reticent to
recognize any cause of action or entitlement to relief.6 The ability of the
plaintiff to operate a successful business was considered insufficient to
outweigh the important societal value of free competition. However, as
businesspeople were able to explain how their competitor's actions crossed
the line from "fair" to "unfair" competition, the common law of unfair
competition, including trade secret law, began to emerge.7 As it did, two
countervailing concerns arose: how to ensure that the emerging business torts
were recognized and defined consistently throughout the United States; and
See Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to
Understandthe Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005 (2001) (discussing
the history of the principle that every wrong deserves a remedy and its inclusion in the
constitutions of thirty-nine states); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REv.
1197 (1992) (discussing the origins of state constitutional "remedy guarantees, also known as
'open courts clauses"').
4
See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY (2003).
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 6 (1934) (stating that "tortious" denotes
"conduct whether an act or omission [that] is of such a character as to subject the actor to
liability under principles of the law of torts").
6
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (acknowledging reticence by
recognizing a privilege to compete: "The freedom to engage in business and to compete for
patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise of the free enterprise system.");
accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a. (1995) (providing further
support by framing competition as a right rather than a privilege).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, Division Nine, interference with
Business Relations (1939); HARRY D. NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS (4th ed. 1947); Rudolf Callman, What is Unfair Competition?, 28 GEO. L.J. 585
(1940). See also, RISDALE ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 9 (1953) (noting "the line of demarcation
between fair and unfair competition is uncertain and may change from one decade to the
next").
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how to limit the scope of business torts so that they would not become
anticompetitive weapons.
Having emerged from the common law, trade secret law could have
continued to develop through the common law process like a variety of other
torts. In such case, the courts of each state would have had the freedom to
accept or reject various arguments for the recognition, expansion, or
narrowing of trade secret law as they saw fit, subject to principles of stare
decisis and the direction (if any) of legislatures. For a variety of reasons,
however, the evolution of trade secret law shifted from the crucible of the
courtroom and the common law process to the uniform lawmaking and
legislative processes. This article tells the story of that shift and how, as a
result, the channels in which the courts of most states can operate. when
interpreting and applying U.S. trade secret law were confined by the
adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the UTSA).'
The story of the evolution of trade secret law begins in Part II with a
brief examination of the development of trade secret law at common law up
through the publication by the American Law Institute of the Restatement
(First) of Torts, Volume IV in 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Restatement First").9 Part III then examines the forces and concerns that
motivated members of the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the
American Bar Association ("the PTC") to begin drafting a uniform law of
trade secrecy and the subsequent referral of that work to the National
Council of Commissioners of Uniform State Law ("NCCUSL").o Part IV
seeks to cure deficiencies that exist in the interpretation and application of
trade secret law by providing a detailed history of the context, purpose, and
intended meaning of the UTSA." To understand the purpose and
significance of the UTSA fully, Part V discusses the important differences
between the common law-particularly as expressed in a Restatement-and
a codified, uniform law.12
Generally, the idea for a uniform act to govern trade secrets arose
among the practicing bar as part of an extensive and long-term exploration of
laws governing unfair competition. For more than twenty-five years, from
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (1985); see also National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/
uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2010) (demonstrating that the UTSA has been
adopted in forty-five states, the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and that the
five states that have yet adopted the UTSA are Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, North
Carolina, and Texas); but see also JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS §2.03[7][a] (1997)
(demonstrating that how one counts adoptions apparently depends upon how the trade secrets
statutes are labeled and stating that 43 states have adopted the UTSA, with 3 others adopting
trade secret statutes not patterned on the UTSA).
9
See infra Part I.
"o See infra Part II. The PTC is now known as the Intellectual Property Section of
the American Bar Association. NCCUSL is also known under its new, updated brand: The
Uniform Law Commission.
See infra Part III.
8

12

See infra Part IV.
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the early-1940s through the mid-1960s, the practicing bar was extremely
concerned that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins precluded the common law development of unfair competition law
at the federal level.13 Later, with the Supreme Court's decision in the
Sears/Compco cases, the practicing bar worried that state unfair competition
law, including trade secret law, would disappear altogether.14 The idea to
adopt a uniform trade secrets act-as well as the Lanham Act of 1946,' the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the UDTPA), 16 and the Uniform
out of what is referred to herein as "the
Trademarks Act,' 7-grew
and the business community's interest in wellsqueeze"
Erie/Sears/Compco
defined, predictable, and uniform business torts.'8
Although the initial impetus behind the adoption of the UTSA was
concern that Erie prevented the development of a federal body of unfair
competition law, ultimately the drafters of the UTSA saw an opportunity to
alter the speed and course of development of the common law of trade
secrecy.' 9 The use of statutes to change, and hopefully improve, the law is a
common story in the evolution of the law. Businesses often prefer statutory
law to common law because statutes can be used to secure legal protection
for interests that common law courts are slow to recognize. Statutes are also
used to modify existing legal principles by, for instance, limiting the scope of
established legal rights or more clearly defining the parameters of such rights
in order to add consistency, predictability, and uniformity. When legislatures
See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See generally Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 376 U.S. 234 (1964)
(effectively restricting the ability of states to fashion unfair competition laws); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co, 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
15 Lanham Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2010)).
16 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966) (replacing the act that had first been adopted in
1964). See also Richard F. Dole, Unform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Effect of Sears
Compco, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1965).
"
See H. Bowen Wands, Priority:Lanham Act or Model State TrademarkBill, 58
TRADEMARK REP. 801 (1968) (noting that a Model State Trademark Bill had been adopted in
thirty-six states).
1
JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 12 (1982) (commenting on
the shift from the common law development of the law to the legislative process: "Legislation
bulked larger in social regulation when more numerous and varied interests began to press
claims for attention, and when politically effective opinion sensed a need to bring more factors
into policy calculations").
19
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note (1985) ("Notwithstanding the
commercial importance of state trade secret law to interstate business, this law has not
developed satisfactorily. In the first place, its development is uneven.. . . Secondly, even in
states in which there has been significant litigation, there is undue uncertainty concerning the
parameters of trade secret protection, and the appropriate remedies for misappropriation of a
trade secret."). See also John P. Sutton, Trade Secret Legislation, 9 IDEA 587, 590 (19651966) (after noting the confused state of trade secret law, particularly with respect to its
theoretical basis, Mr. Sutton stated: "It therefore would appear propitious that legislation is
pending to bring some degree of order out of chaos").
13

14
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heed the call for more consistency, predictability, and uniformity, judges
should take notice and discontinue the common law development of the law
as appropriate. Once a body of law is codified-as is the case with trade
secret law as expressed in the UTSA-it is the statute itself and not the old
20
common law that should govern.
II. THE COMMON LAW EVOLUTION OF U.S. TRADE SECRET
LAW: 1837 THROUGH 1939
Based upon a review of the cases cited in the Appendix to the
Restatement First, the development of trade secret law in the United Stated
began in 1837 with the case of Vickery v. Welch, and was based on principles
of law and equity first developed by English courts.2 1 Two essential
questions confronted early courts in trade secret cases. First was whether the
actions of the defendant were sufficiently wrongful to justify relief. As one
court framed the issue, "[t]he distinction lies between pirating and competing
for customers."2 2 If the first question was answered affirmatively, the nature
of appropriate relief had to be determined. Because a distinction existed in
the early history of the United States between courts of law and courts of
equity, the question of appropriate remedies often boiled down to the court
where the action was filed and how the case was characterized.23
The general complaint of early plaintiffs was that the defendant
20 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, Introductory Note (1995)
(demonstrating that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which replaced the unfair
competition provisions of the Restatement (First) of Torts, recognizes the importance of
statutory enactments by basing most of its content concerning trade secrets on the UTSA); see
also David S. Almeling, et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GoNZ. L. REv. 291 (2010) (providing empirical evidence that the influence of the
Restatement (First) of Torts may be waning). But see ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSON,
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[1] (2009) ("Despite the UTSA's widespread adoption, the
Restatement [First] Definition [of trade secrets] retains vitality and is often referred to by
courts during the course of their deliberation in applying the UTSA."); POOLEY, supra note 8,
at § 2.02[3] (noting that even courts interpreting the UTSA continue to refer to the
Restatement (First) of Torts).
21 Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1 Pick. 1837); see also Peabody v. Norfolk,
98 Mass 452 (Mass. 1868) (citing to numerous pertinent English cases) and Catherine L. Fisk,
Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of
CorporateIntellectualProperty, 1800-1920, 52 Hastings L.J. 441 (2000).
22 Newark Cleaning & Dye Works, Inc. v. Gross, 126 A. 789 (N.J. 1925).
23
ELLIS, supra note 7, at 4 ("In general, protection given trade secrets is based on
common law and equity and not on statutory provisions."); see also T. Leigh Anenson,
Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-MergerJustification of Unclean Hands, 45 AM. Bus. L.J.
455, 456 (2008) (noting that the merger of law and equity in the United States began with the
New York Field Code in 1848 and culminated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure almost
one hundred years later); John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History
ofAmerican Judging, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1425 (1998) (providing a good history of the division
of courts of law and courts of equity in the early history of the United States); see also, e.g.,
NIMS, supra note 7, § 143 ("Equity will restrain breach of a contract not to disclose a trade
secret.").
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caused or threatened to cause harm to plaintiffs business by using or
disclosing secret information. For instance, in Vickery v. Welch, the plaintiff
complained that the defendant threatened to disclose the art and secret
manner of making chocolate.24 Because courts were unwilling to find an
absolute property interest in secret information, the success of early trade
secret cases depended upon the existence of an express or implied agreement
of confidentiality or breach of faith.25 As the Court in Peabody v. Norfolk
explained:
If he invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of
manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he
has not indeed an exclusive right to it against the public, or
against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but
he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect
against one who in violation of contract and breach of
confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to
disclose it to third persons.
As a matter of equity, the defendant in Peabody was bound by an agreement
of confidentiality not to disclose information about the machines and
processes used to make gunny cloth.27
The existence of secret information coupled with an express or
implied agreement of confidentiality made it easy for common law courts to
impose liability on individuals or companies who were parties to the
agreement because breach of contract and breach of trust were wellrecognized wrongs. The more difficult issue for some courts was to
determine if secret information actually existed. 2 8 This led to the
development of principles for differentiating between protectable
information and unprotectable information, including the concept of
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. 29 In Hamilton Manufacturing Co v.
Tubbs Manufacturing Co., for instance, the Court was careful to distinguish
between secret information on one hand and public information, general
skill, and knowledge on the other.30 The Court noted:
Vickery, 36 Mass. at 525-26.
See, e.g., Morison v. Moat, 68 E.R. 492 (Ct. of Chancery 1851) ("What we
have to deal with here is, not the right of the Plaintiffs against the world, but their right against
the Defendant"); Stewart v. Hook, 45 S.E. 369, 370 (Ga. 1903) ("The property right in an
unpatented preparation, however, is not an unqualified one, and is only exclusive until, by
publication, it becomes the property of the public.").
26
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (Mass. 1868); see also BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 247 (8th ed. 2004) (demonstrating that a "chancery courts" were courts of
equity).
2
Peabody, 98 Mass. at 452-53.
28
Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12 (N.Y. 1889).
29
See, e.g., Schavoir v. American Rebonded Leather Co., 133 A. 582
(Conn. 1926); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 401-06 (W.D. Mich. 1908);
Stone v. Goss, 55 A. 736, 737 (N.J. 1903); Tabor, 23 N.E. at 12; McClary v. Hubbard, 122 A.
469 (Vt. 1923).
30
Hamilton Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401.
24
25
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There can be no property in a process, and no right of
protection, if knowledge of it is common to the world. It
would be a violation of every right of an employee of a
manufacturer to prevent the former from using, in a business
of his own, knowledge which he acquired in the employ of
the latter when he might have acquired such knowledge in
the employ of other manufacturers. Indeed, a contract not to
do so would probably fail of enforcement because of a
restraint of trade.
Another issue that arose in early trade secret cases was the extent to
which an individual's duty of confidentiality could be imposed upon third
parties. Because a critical element of trade secret cases was the existence of
an express or implied obligation of confidentiality, individuals and
companies that were not in privity of contract with the contracting parties, or
that were not otherwise subject to a duty of trust, could not be held liable for
using or disclosing a plaintiffs secrets. This limitation on the scope of the
duty of confidentiality led to the development of theories of third party
liability that generally required the third party to have knowledge of both the
existence of a trade secret and the duty of confidentiality. For instance, in
Stone v. Goss, after first finding that plaintiffs former employee, Goss, was
under a duty of confidentiality, the Court imposed a similar duty on Goss's
new employer due to its intention to acquire plaintiffs secret information. 32
Similarly, in Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., the Court imposed
a duty of confidentiality on an original incorporator of the plaintiff due to,
among other things, his knowledge of the fact that the secrets had been
acquired at great expense from another.3 3
Early courts were also troubled with issues of standing. If the wrong
committed was "unfair competition," then they were reluctant to grant relief
to plaintiffs who were not in competition with the alleged wrongdoer. As
explained in a 1941 article by the President of the Federal Trade
Commission:
The early view in this country, as in many others, limited
[unfair competition] primarily to cases of passing off the
product of one competitor as and for another. Today's broad
view of the term as used in the United States embraces not
only all business practices deemed to be legally unfair to
competitors or business rivals, but also those considered to
be unfair to the public generally. . . .34
By the time the American Law Institute published volume IV of the
Restatement First in 1939, the common law of trade secrecy had developed
31

Id. at 407.

32

Stone, 55 A. 736.
Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Am. Can Co., 67 A. 339 (N.J. 1907).
Robert E. Freer, Some Concepts of Unfair Competition at Home and Abroad,

3
34

31 TRADEMARK REP. 51 (1941).
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sufficiently so that a defendant's alleged wrongdoing could be detailed in
three sections. As set forth in § 757, a person could be liable for disclosing or
using another's trade secret based upon the traditional theory of a breach of
confidence, but also because of: (1) discovery by improper means; (2)
acquisition of the secret by a third party with notice of the fact of secrecy and
the duty of confidentiality; and (3) acquisition of the secret with notice of the
fact of secrecy and knowledge that it was disclosed by mistake.3 s Section 758
stated the rule that the innocent discovery of trade secrets is not actionable,
but created an exception in cases where the defendant received notice of the
misappropriation before a material change in his or her position. Section
759 addressed the situation where business information not qualifying as a
trade secret is acquired using "improper means," stating that the acquisition
of such information by improper means was actionable if it was "for the
purpose of advancing a rival business interest."37
Although the trade secret provisions of the Restatement First attempt
to summarize the state of trade secret law circa 1939, what is more telling is
the content and organization of the commentary that follows each section.
While trade secret law had developed so that three forms of wrongdoing
could be set forth in §§ 757 through 759, the precise parameters and details
of a cause of action were left to be developed and refined by common law
courts. Rather than state specific rules within the text of the trade secret
provisions themselves-apparently because the law had not evolved
sufficiently in enough states to allow them to do so-the drafters of the
Restatement First only identified key issues and provided suggestions for
their possible resolution. As noted in the comments to § 757, these issues
included: (1) how to balance the privilege to compete with the existence of a
trade secret claim; (2) the definition of a trade secret; (3) the circumstances
under which a defendant should be held liable for disclosure (as opposed to
use) of a trade secret; (4) whether and to what extent a privilege to disclose
or use another's trade secrets exists; (5) the nature of available remedies; (6)
the meaning of "improper means"; (7) the meaning and scope of a breach of
confidence; and (8) the necessary intent or knowledge of the defendant.
By the time of the adoption of the UTSA in 1979, forty years had
passed since the publication of the Restatement First and the drafters of the
UTSA had the benefit of the further common law development of trade
secret law. Also by then, the courts of law and equity in the United States
had merged and there was a much greater reliance on and reception of
statutory law. 40 As detailed in Parts III and IV below, because the UTSA is a
code rather than a restatement of existing law, it was used to fill gaps in the
3
36

3
38

3
40

RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757 (1934).
Id. § 758.
Id. § 759.
See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmts. a-g.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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law that had not been filled by common law courts and to refine or change
common law principles that were considered ill-advised. With respect to
many of the issues that are addressed in the comments to the Restatement
First, the drafters of the UTSA substituted the flexible guidelines of the
Restatement's comments with mandatory rules.
III. THE IMPETUS BEHIND THE UTSA
Between 1939 and 1988, the Restatement First was the primary
source for an understanding of the purpose and meaning of trade secret law
in the United States.4 1 Given the long history of the development and
application of common law trade secret principles in the United Statesroughly from the date of the first trade secret cases in the mid- 1800s through
the mid-1960s when the UTSA drafting process began-one may wonder
why members of the practicing bar felt compelled to advocate for the
adoption of a uniform law to govern trade secrets. By the mid-1960s, in
addition to the Restatement First, there were plenty of judicial decisions and
several treatises available to judges and lawyers that could be consulted to
explain the current parameters of U.S. trade secret law.42 Why then the need
for a uniform trade secret law that was recommended for adoption in all fifty
states?
One answer stems from the slow pace and frequently inconsistent
development of the common law, and the impatience of individuals and
companies who believed that their interests were not adequately protected.43
Although business interests may at first be reluctant to embrace the
development of new torts, particularly personal injury torts, the history of
unfair competition law reveals that there is often a point in time in the
development of business torts when business interests prefer to embrace a
clearly defined, predictable, and uniform cause of action instead of being
subjected to the uncertainty of amorphous and ill-defined common law torts.
Indeed, this is one of the reasons for the merger of courts of law and equity;
the unpredictability of equity courts was uncomfortable to many." The
41

See ALASKA

STAT.

§§ 45.50, 910-45 (demonstrating that the UTSA became the

predominate law governing trade secrets in the United States when it went into effect in
Alaska-the twenty-sixth state to adopt the UTSA-on September 2, 1988).
42
See ELLIS, supra note 7; NIMs, supra note 7, at Ch. XI (concerning trade
secrets); Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, IV Misappropriationof Commercial
Intangibles, B. Trade Secrets, 77 HARv. L. REv. 947 (1964). See also ROGER MILGRIM,
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS (1st ed. 1968).
43
Julius R. Lunsford, Unfair Competition: Unform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L.
REV. 583 (1958) (describing the slow pace of unfair competition law post Erie and the
Lanham Act).

See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT; A STUDY OF
"
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM, 185-86 (1981) ("The retention of the inherited dual court
system-law and equity-in [NY] was the cause of much uncertainty as to the proper mode of
redress and, consequently, a source of additional bitter complaint.").
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power of state and federal legislatures to enact laws gives those who are
frustrated with the uncertainty and pace of the common law the ability to
speed up or change the development of the law to better suit their interests.4 5
This power became particularly important to the practicing bar as a result of
the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins in 1938.46
A. The Effect of Erie
More than seventy-years removed from the U.S Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Erie and the subsequent enactment of numerous federal
laws under Congress's Commerce Clause power, it is perhaps hard to
imagine the uproar that Erie caused among the practicing bar and U.S.
business interests. Precisely at the time that business and industry was
becoming less localized and more national and international, and the need for
national legal standards became more pronounced, the Supreme Court ruled
that, "there is no federal general common law."48
Although the Erie decision had implications for all rulings of the
federal judiciary in diversity cases, its impact upon the law of unfair
competition was of particular concern to U.S. business interests. Initially, the
concern related to the inability to rely upon federal precedents to define the
parameters of unfair competition in the United States. Because of Erie, the
federal judiciary was out of the business of developing the common law
except in connection with the interpretation and application of federal
See Edward S. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition, 38 TRADEMARK
45
REP. 259, 269-70 (1948), reprinted in 54 TRADEMARK REP. 752 (1964) ("Experience shows
that by the time the judicial machinery reaches a place where the pirate was yesterday, and is
ready to deal with him, that elusive person has moved forward and is still a little ahead-at a
place where the courts will not reach until tomorrow-and is there engaged in doing
something which will enable him to advantage himself at someone else's expense in some
manner hitherto unthought of.").
46
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
47
See E. Manning Giles, Unfair Competition and the Overextension of the Erie
Doctrine, 41 TRADEMARK REP. 1056 (1951); John R. Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of
Sears Compco: A Pleafor a Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 16
(1966); Harry Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336 (1938); Sergei S.
Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-marks and Unfair Competition,
32 TRADEMARK REP. 81, 99 (1942); Rogers, supra note 45, at 259. See also, The Proposed
Federal Unfair Competition Statute, Brief in Support of CongressionalPassageof Proposed
Unfair Competition Amendment to Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 57 TRADEMARK REP. 87
(1967) [hereinafter Brief in Support of CongressionalPassage].
48
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see Statement of W.G. Reynolds in support of Unfair
Activities Bill, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 785 (1964) (noting the "swing to direct selling," the
increased importance of advertising, and the "mushrooming of supermarkets" as creating a
new economic environment where federal principles of unfair completion are needed). See
also Peterson, supra note 47, at 25 ("The result of Erie in the field of unfair competition, has
been a bewildering hodge-podge of conflicting decisions which defies harmonization into a
uniform national body of law.").
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statutes, meaning that the development and refinement of unfair competition
law was left to state courts. 4 9 However, "the rub was that state law marked
time during the period that federal law was evolving" and had not developed
sufficiently or consistently.so Thus, as Erie forced lawyers and their clients to
learn more about principles of unfair competition at the state level, the
concern about the irrelevance of federal precedents was replaced by a fear
about the actual details (or lack thereof) of state law. As explained in an
influential 1948 article by Edward S. Rogers:
Soon there was built up by decisions of the Federal Court a
great body of Federal Law dealing with trademarks and
unfair competition. It was a great convenience to the bar
because lawyers knew or could easily learn what the
decisions were and there were enough of them to give a
comprehensive picture. Then came Erie ... which required
Federal Courts to apply the law of the State in which they sit,
and there was chaos. There were 48 different sovereignties,
the decisions of whose courts were the only law. The body
of Federal decision which was 50 years evolving was not
binding either on the State or the Federal Courts. Nobody
knew what the law was. It was frequently found that there
were no applicable State decisions or that the decisions in
the States comprising the same circuit were not uniform.5 1
Some of the concerns regarding the gaps in unfair competition law
that resulted from Erie were resolved with the enactment in 1946 of the
Lanham Act.52 However, concerns about the scope of federal trademark law,
and more broadly unfair competition law, continued to persist among the
practicing bar for more than twenty years. Heeding the original call of
49
See Giles, supra note 47, at 1056 (discussing the difference between "federal
general common law" and "federal common law" and noting the power of federal courts to
construe and supplement federal statutory law).
5o National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Revised
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Prefatory Note (1966) (reprinted as Richard Dole,
Unform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Effect of Sears Compco, 55 Trademark Rep. 267,
435-36 (1965)).
51
Rogers, supra note 45, at 259; see Louis Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and
After the Stiffel Case, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 731, 736 (1964) ("Federal unfair competition
legislation to counteract the effects of Erie was suggested by Mr. Edward S. Rogers speaking
before the Practicing Law Institute at New York City in 1947."); see also Rogers, supra note
45, at 271 (demonstrating that Mr. Rogers's proposed legislation included a broad and flexible
definition of unfair competition, coupled with a list of specific acts of wrongdoing including
the act of "inducing disclosure of confidential information" and "any other act or deed
contrary to good faith or honorable commercial usage.").
52
Lanham Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2010)). Cf H. M. McLarin, The 1941 Revised Lanham Trademark Bill, Being a Description and History of the 1941 Revision of the Lanham Trade-mark
Bill, 31 TRADEMARK REP. 87(1941) (giving the reasons for the Lanham Bill, including the
need of modem business for more certainty).
5
Lunsford, supra note 43, at 583 (lamenting the failure of federal courts to
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Edward Rogers, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York began to
advocate for the adoption of a federal law to govern unfair competition.5 4
Designed to take advantage of the recently developed Lincoln Mills doctrine,
the general goal of a federal unfair competition law was "to permit the
federal courts to resume the fashioning of a uniform and dynamic body of
national unfair competition law without compelling recourse to variegated or
inadequate state precedents, i.e., 'checker-board law."' 5
Beginning with the start of the two-year legislative session in 1959,
Congress member John Lindsay biennially introduced legislation to enact a
6
federal law of unfair competition that would supplement the Lanham Act.5
As set forth in the 1963 version of the bill, the proposed law would allow
"any person damaged or likely to be damaged by unfair commercial
activities in or affecting commerce" to bring a civil action in federal court to
obtain injunctive relief, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees.57 Unfair
commercial activities were defined to include "the commission for purposes
of profit of any ... act or practice which. . . violates reasonable standards of

commercial ethics."' 8 In order to overcome the reluctance of common law
courts to grant relief in cases where there was no direct competition and no
proof of actual damages, the legislation further provided that injunctive relief
could be granted despite the "absence of competition between the parties or
actual damage to the person seeking protection."59
The Lindsay Bill received its first-and apparently only-formal

interpret § 43 of the Lanham Act as a general federal law of unfair competition); Peterson,
supra note 47, at 43 ("Even as the Lanham Act was achieving judicial recognition as a limited
federal law of unfair competition, work commenced upon presentation of a separate federal
code of unfair competition.").
Peterson, supra note 47, at 43; see also Kunin, supra note 51, at 736 ("From
54
Mr. Rogers' first draft, after several years of work commenced by the Committee on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
there has now evolved the Lindsay Bill. First introduced in the House in 1959, it was widely
circulated among professional groups and other interested parties. A revised version was reintroduced in 1961. After further circulation and comment, the Bill was revised again and
offered in 1962. Once again, after thorough review by interested groups, additional
amendments were made before a current version of the Bill was introduced in both the House
and Senate in 1963."); Sidney A. Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercial
Activities Act, 52 TRADEMARK REP. 104 (1962).
ss Kunin, supra note 51, at 732-33 (citing the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. 448); see also Textile Workers Union of
Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (holding that the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 not only gave federal courts jurisdiction in labor disputes, but enabled
federal courts to "fashion a body of federal law" to govern such disputes).
56
See H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 10038, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962); S. 1036, 87th Cong.; S. 2784, 87th Cong.; S. 1038, 88th Cong.
1
H.R. 4651 and S. 1038, 88th Cong. 1st Session (1963).
58
Id. § 3(d).
5
Id. § 4.
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hearing in June of 1964.60 Congressman Lindsay explained, "The basic
purpose of the bill is to create a Federal statutory cause of action that could
be invoked by an injured party as an alternative to the common law tort of
unfair competition in cases where interstate commerce is affected." 6' In his
testimony in support of the legislation, W.G. Reynolds, then President of the
United States Trademark Association, noted that the legislation would fulfill
three needs:
(a) a sore need to fill-in missing gaps in existing remedies
against unfair commercial activities; (b) a need for
modernizing these remedies to cope with drastic changes
that have been going on all about us in the field of interstate
commerce, and (c) a need for encouragement to reputable
businessmen who are bewildered and puzzled by the failure
of the present law to provide relief commensurate with the
shifting wrongs which they are encountering in their day to
day business activities.62
At the same time federal legislation was being pursued, efforts were also
undertaken by members of the practicing bar to fill gaps in state unfair
competition law through, among other means, the adoption of a number of
uniform state laws, including the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(UDTPA) and state trademark registration acts.63 As explained in the
Prefatory Note to the UDTPA:
In 1958 the Section of Patents, Trademark and Copyright
60
Walter J. Derenberg, The Seventeenth Year of Administration of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 655 (1964) (noting first hearing on Lindsay Bill
and opposition thereto from the Attorney General's Office and the Federal Trade
Commission).
61
Hearings on H.R. 4651 before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2nd Session 9 (1964).
62
Rogers, supra note 45, at 785 (emphasis added).
63
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966). Cf Kunin, supra note 51, at 375, 734-35
(demonstrating that other strategies and theories for resurrecting a federal body of unfair
competition were attempted without success); e.g. id. at 735 (citing National Fruit Prods. Co.
v. Dwinnel-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942)) (explaining that beginning in 1942,
there was a series of cases in which plaintiffs argued that § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act created a private right of action that would allow individuals and businesses
to bring a suit in federal court.); id at 735 (citing Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F. 2d 962 (9th
Cir. 1950)) (demonstrating that in 1950, the Ninth Circuit took the position that §§ 44(b), (h),
and (i) of the Lanham Act conferred federal jurisdiction over unfair competition claims); id. at
734-35 (citing Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., 269 F 2d 375 (9th Cir. 1959))
(stating that there was a series of cases, beginning with Kemart Corp., in which it was
contended that the unfair competition provisions of the Paris Convention and the InterAmerican Convention were self-executing and, therefore, the "supreme law of the land" under
the U.S. Constitution and that, as a result, federal courts were authorized to develop a federal
body of unfair competition); id. at 375 (citing L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. LanaLobell, Inc., 214
F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954)) (arguing that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act should be interpreted to
cover ordinary cases of passing off and product simulation).
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Law of the American Bar Association passed a resolution
which stated that "there should be uniformity in the law of
unfair competition among the respective states.". . . Since
the provisions of the Lindsey Bill and of the Uniform Act are
sufficiently similar, the main question is the route by which
uniformity is obtained-voluntary adoption by the state
legislatures or by a federal act imposing a particular rule on
the states.
The Uniform Act is designed to bring state law up to date by
removing undue restrictions on the common law action for
deceptive trade practices. Certain objectionable practices are
singled out, but courts are left free to fix the proper ambit of
the act in case by case adjudication."
Thus, in the same way that the Lindsay legislation was designed both
to fill the vacuum in unfair competition law that was left by Erie and to
provide more uniformity, certainty, and clarity in the law of unfair
competition at the federal level, the proposed uniform state laws were
designed to supplement and change a body of law that was thought to be
deficient, including the law of trade secrecy.
B. The Erie/Sears/Compco Squeeze
The need for a federal law to govern unfair competition became
more urgent in 1964 as a result of the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze. In the
companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stifel Co. and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., decided on the same date in March 1964, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the unfair competition laws of Illinois which
prohibited product simulation, were preempted by federal patent law.6' This
created a dilemma for business interests concerned about the development of
unfair competition law in the United States. Having learned from Erie that
the federal judiciary had a very limited role to play in the development of
common law, the practicing bar was now shocked to learn that the very
entities that were charged with developing unfair competition law-state
courts and legislatures-were prevented by principles of federal preemption
from adopting state laws that interfered with federal patent policies.6 6
John Peterson, then Chairman of the Unfair Competition Committee
of the American Patent Law Association (now the American Intellectual
Property Law Association) expressed the concerns of the practicing bar:
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform
6
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966).
65 See generally Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
See Ciro A. Gamboni, Unfair Competition Protectionafter Sears Compco, 55
6
TRADEMARK REP. 964 (1965).
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The sweeping language of the Court in Sears and Compco
has made it uncertain how these decisions are to be applied
in subsequent cases presenting differing factual situations,
and whether they are to be limited to cases of product
simulation or are to be extended to the whole field of unfair
67
competition.
The practicing bar was so concerned about the impact of the
Sears/Compco decisions that the United States Trademark Association (now
the International Trademark Association or "INTA") regularly reported on
developments in the area of state unfair competition in a section of an annual
review of the Lanham Act labeled "Unfair Competition and the SearsCompco Doctrine," lauding any decision that appeared to limit application of
the Sears/Compco doctrine.
An obvious solution to the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze was the
enactment of federal legislation along the lines of the Lindsay Bill. However,
concerned members of the bar were not content to leave a solution up to
Congress, particularly since the Lindsay Bill had not progressed much in five
years.6 Apparently, the critical difficulty in enacting such a law revolved
around the definition of unfair competition. Some proponents of a federal
law of unfair competition favored broad, general language that might
prohibit still unknown forms of unfair competition. Others were fearful of an
open-ended definition, and advocated for the specification of particular
wrongful acts. Thus, in addition to federal legislation, various other strategies
were pursued including: arguments made in a variety of cases to limit the
effects of the Erie and Sears/Compco decisions; proposed amendments to the
Federal Trade Commission Act; and the adoption of a state Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.70 Proposals were also made for the adoption
of federal legislation to make it clear that patent law was not intended to
Peterson, supra note 47, at 28.
6
See, e.g., Bowen Wands, supra note 17, at 710; Walter J. Derenberg, The
Twenty-Fifth Year of Administration of the Lanham Act of 1946, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 393,
499 (Aug. 1972); Walter J. Derenberg, The Twenty-Fourth Year of Administration of the
Lanham Act of 1946, 61 TRADEMARK REP. 257, 322 (July 1971); Walter J. Derenberg, The
Twenty-Third Year of Administration of the Lanham Act of 1946, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 387,
462 (Aug. 1970); Walter J. Derenberg, The Twenty-Second Year of Administration of the
Lanham Act of 1946, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 625, 712 (Aug. 1969); Kenneth B. Germain, The
Thirty-Fourth Year of Administration of the Lanham Act of 1946, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 285,
495 (July-Aug. 1981); Peterson, supra note 47, at 776; Brief in Support of Congressional
Passage,supra note 47, at 735.
69
Peterson, supra note 47, at 45 ("This Bill, representing a distillation of years of
hard and painstaking effort, has produced reactions ranging from enthusiastic support to bitter
denunciation ... it has been attacked for its vagueness, for its failure to give definition to the
term 'unfair commercial activity,' and for extending the law beyond the bounds of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.").
70
Id. at 28-48; see also id., at n.181 (giving a history of the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act); supra note 68 (providing citations for the Unfair Competition and the
Sears-Compco Doctrine section in the TRADEMARK REP., which cites cases relevant to this
discussion).
67
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preempt state trade secret law." The practicing bar's interest in solving the
Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze was so great that a "National Coordinating
Committee," consisting of over 36 professional associations, was formed for
the purpose of finding a solution.72 Members of this Committee included the
American Patent Law Association, the United States Trademark Association,
and the PTC Section of the American Bar Association. In 1966, the PTC
decided to consider the need for a uniform trade secret law. 3
C. The Work of the PTC Section of the American Bar Association
As detailed in the 1966 Report of Committee 402, the PTC had
frequently been asked to consider what it referred to as the "perennial
Lindsay Bill." 74 In 1962, a resolution favoring the legislation was defeated
by a margin of 75 to 66. In 1963 and 1964, however, resolutions favoring
the bill were passed. Two reasons were given for support of the Lindsay
Bill: the need to replace "variegated state precedents resulting from Erie,"
and the need to resolve "the federal-state conflict" noted in the

Sears/Compco cases.
When the Lindsay Bill stalled in Congress, its supporters proposed to
effectuate its purposes by amending the Lanham Act.78 There followed
additional efforts by members of the PTC and the National Coordinating
71 TRADE SECRETS, INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS, AND RELATED MATTERS,
SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 252-53
A.B.A.
1974
(report of Roger M. Milgrim, Chairman) [hereinafter TRADE SECRETS 1974] (detailing
resolutions to this effect since 1969); TRADE SECRETS, INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS AND
RELATED MATTERS, 1973 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP.
§ 402, at 173-74 (report of Richard F. Dole, Chairman) [hereinafter TRADE SECRETS 19731.
Brief in Support of CongressionalPassage,supranote 47, at 89-91, n.5.
72
Id; see also PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL RIGHTS AND KNOW-How, 1967
73
A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 59 (report of James
M. Heilman, Chairman, Comm. 107) [hereinafter PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL RIGHTS
1967]; TRADE SECRETS, INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS AND RELATED MATTERS, 1967
A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 140 (report of
Robert E. Isner, Chairman, Comm. 107).
UNFAIR COMPETITION, 1966 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
74
COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 126 (report of Dayton R. Stemple, Jr., Chairman) [hereinafter
UNFAIR COMPETITION 1966]. Cf UNFAIR COMPETITION, 1963 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 164 (report of Boynton P. Livingston, Chairman)
[hereinafter UNFAIR COMPETITION 1963] (demonstrating that at the time of the drafting of the
UTSA, Committee 402 was the committee charged with considering issues related to the law
of unfair competition, including "state and federal laws relating to trade secrets," "problems
arising out of violations of trade secrets and inducement of breach of contract," and "other
possible forms of unfair competition").
7
UNFAIR COMPETITION 1966, supra note 74.
76

Id.

UNFAIR COMPETITION, 1964 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
7
COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 108-09 (report of Louis Kunin, Chairman).
Tom Arnold, A Federal Unfair Competition Law, McClellan S. 3681, 89th
78
Cong., 57 TRADEMARK REP. 116, 117 (1967).
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Committee to fashion legislation that would be acceptable to both the
practicing bar and members of Congress. 79 Known as the "McClellan Bill,"
after the Senator who introduced it, and denominated the "Unfair
Competition Act of 1966," this legislation differed from the Lindsay Bill in a
number of respects, most notably, rather than establishing a separate federal
law of unfair competition, it proposed various amendments to § 43 of the
Lanham Act.8o Among its proposed provisions was new § 43(a)(4), which
would have imposed civil liability on any person who engaged "in any act,
trade practice, or course of conduct" that "results or is likely to result in the
wrongful disclosure or misappropriation of a trade secret or other research or
development or commercial information maintained in confidence by
another."8
As described in a brief in support of the McClellan Bill, the
legislation was needed to: (1) fill the gaps in the common law of unfair
competition that were left by Erie; (2) resolve conflicting state rulings and
approaches; (3) eliminate the conflict of laws problem resulting from
increased interstate commerce; (4) foster greater uniformity; (5) provide a
framework for the development of a federal common law of unfair
competition; and (6) provide for remedies consistent with those provided
under the patent and copyright statutes.82 In other words, like the UTSA that
followed it, the McClellan Bill was not designed simply to codify existing
principles of unfair competition law; it was designed to alter those principles
in several respects.
Debate about the proposed Unfair Competition Act of 1966 included
the question whether the Act should include a broad catch-all provision or be
limited to a specific list of actionable wrongs. A compromise was struck to
include specific examples of unfair competition followed by a generic
definition of unfair competition that, consistent with the language of Article
10bis of the Paris Convention, prohibited any act that "is otherwise contrary
to commercial good faith or to normal and honest practices of the business or
activity in which he is engaged." 8 4 With respect to the proposed trade secret
7
8
81

UNFAIR COMPETITION 1966, supra note 74, at 127-28.
See S. 3681, 89th Cong., 2nd Session and S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Session.
id.

Brief in Support of CongressionalPassage,supra note 47, at 89.
UNFAIR COMPETITION 1966, supra note 74, at 128 ("The generic approach of
the Lindsay bill and the proposed amendment to the Lanham Act appears to be favored now
by a large majority").
8
Id. at 130; see also Brief in Support of CongressionalPassage,supra note 47,
at 104. Cf Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: The Story of Article 39 of
TRIPS and the Limited Scope of Trade Secret Protection in the United States, in THE LAW
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY, A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Rochelle
Dreyfuss & Katherine Strandburg, eds., Edward Elgar, 2011) (explaining that a similar
compromise was reached in the drafting of Article 39 of the World Trade Organization,
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement),
following the United States's proposal to add trade secret misappropriation to the list of acts
of unfair competition specifically recognized by the international community).
82

83
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provision, an issue arose about how to draft the language so that it would
cover information that was not absolutely secret-that is, information that is
disclosed to another in the course of a confidential relationship."s Due to
controversy about the desired breadth of a trade secret provision, two
alternative definitions of protectable information were initially proposed: the
"limited" provision that was ultimately selected, and a "broad" provision that
would have prohibited any act that "results or is likely to result in the unfair
impairment or wrongful appropriation of a trade secret or contract right of
another or an intangible asset deriving from the investment, labor or skill or

another." 8 6
At the same time that Committee 402 of the PTC had convened to
consider the advisability of a federal law of unfair competition that included
provisions dealing with trade secrets, Committee 107, Protection of
Confidential Rights and Know-How, was considering the same question.
The principal concern of that group was that the scope of trade secret
protection varied from state to state, particularly with respect to the treatment
of departing employees. 8 8 Concern was also expressed that the proposed
amendments to the Lanham Act would not eliminate the need for state law,
and that inconsistency in the laws of various states was leading to forum
shopping. As Leonard B. Mackey, Chairman of the Protection of
Confidential Rights and Know-How, stated:
Recent proliferation of various state statutes, each taking a
slightly different tack than the others, may create a pattern of
legislation resulting in the situs determining the protection to
be afforded the owner of a trade secret. This is undesirable.
It is deemed highly desirable that the problem be approached
through the enactment of a uniform act by states in addition
to any amendment of Federal statutes. 89
In 1968, a resolution favoring the adoption of a uniform trade secrets
act was approved by the PTC and, consistent with a long-standing
Brief in Support of CongressionalPassage,supra note 47, at 101.
Id. at 128-30 ("Those in favor of broad Section 4 [dealing with trade secrets]
contend that misappropriation has become a recognized doctrine in the law of unfair
competition and that it would be wrong to enact a federal statute [sic] in the field that does not
give recognition of such a doctrine. The opponents of the broad Section state that it is contrary
to the express policy of letting the courts develop the substantive law without statutory guide
and that it is so broad that it includes classic patent and copyright infringement and copying of
patented mechanisms after the patent expires which should not be covered by the proposed
Act."); see also id. at 128 (demonstrating that concern was also expressed that the Commerce
Clause could not be used to support the trade secret provisions of the proposed Act),
85
86

87
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL RIGHTS AND KNow-How, 1966 A.B.A. SEC.
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITrEE REP. § 107 (report of Chairman G. Franklin

Rothwell).
See PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL RIGHTS 1967, supra note 73, at 59, 61.
Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1968 A.B.A. SEC. PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 68 (report of Leonard B. Mackey,
Chairman).
88
89
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relationship between the ABA and NCCUSL, the matter was referred to
NCCUSL for further handling.90 At that point, Committee 402 of the PTC
got involved in the uniform law-making process. 91
D. The Initial Work of NCCUSL and Committee 402 of the PTC
As noted above, one way that the practicing bar sought to solve the
Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze was through the adoption of the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.92 According to a 1962 report by the Unfair
Competition Committee of NCCUSL, although it was recognized that there
were several forms of unfair competition, for purposes of the adoption of
uniform laws it was determined that the law of unfair competition should be
divided into the following two general areas:
(1) An Act dealing with false, confusing or deceptive trade
or deceptive
and
false, confusing
identification
[and]
of
goods;
source
or
origin
representations as to the
(2) An Act dealing with trade secrets and confidential
disclosures.93
However, nothing happened at NCCUSL with respect to a uniform trade
secrets act between 1962 and late 1968. The 1968 resolution by the PTC in
support of a uniform trade secrets act, together with expressions of support
from other interested parties, provided the impetus for resurrecting the
.94
project.
The resurrected uniform trade secrets act project began with the
formation within NCCUSL of a "Special Committee on Uniform Trade
Secrets Protection Act" (hereinafter the Special Committee), chaired by
Commissioner Joseph McKeown, and the preparation of a report by
Professor Richard F. Dole, Jr., of the University of Iowa, on the current state

Resolution 14, 1968 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
90
COMMITTEE REP. § 95 (Edward C. Vandenburgh, ed.). Cf Relationship between American Bar

Association and National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (explaining
that the NCCUSL was created in 1892 upon the recommendation of the ABA); Instructions
for ABA Advisors to Drafting Committees of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (February 1, 1979) (demonstrating that the by-laws of NCCUSL
specifically require that it notify and consult with the appropriate committee or section of the
ABA); NCCUSL Drafting Committee Status Report (1978-1979) (demonstrating that at the
time of the adoption of the UTSA in 1979, Edward T. McCabe was the ABA liaison to the
NCCUSL Drafting Committee on Uniform Trade Secrets).

91

TRADE SECRETS, INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS AND RELATED MATTERS,

1969 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 236 (report of
James W. Geriak, Chairman).
92
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
93
Letter from Frances D. Jones, Executive Secretary of NCCUSL, to G.M.
Fuller, Esq. (December 7, 1966).
9
See, e.g., Letter from the American Chemical Society to Allison Dunham of
NCCUSL (April 13, 1969).
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of trade secret law.95 At that time, Professor Dole was the co-chair of
Committee 402 of the PTC. In 1969, he was also appointed by the Governor
of Iowa to serve as a Commissioner of NCCUSL, thereby allowing him to be
directly involved with the UTSA drafting process.
The process of drafting a proposed uniform trade secrets act began in
1970 with the preparation of the "First Tentative Draft, Second Working
Draft." At the same time, and consistent with the historical relationship
between NCCUSL and the ABA, a liaison was established between the
Special Committee and Committee 402 of the PTC. This enabled input to be
obtained from the practicing intellectual property bar at the very beginning of
the drafting process. Because he wore multiple hats (NCCUSL
Commissioner, member of Committee 402 of the PTC, and member of the
Special Committee), Professor Dole became the conduit through which much
of the correspondence and thinking regarding a uniform trade secrets act
flowed.
From 1970 until August 1979 when the UTSA was finally adopted,
the proposed UTSA went through many iterations and refinements, with
different constellations of interested persons expressing views on one or
more topics. For instance, between 1971 and 1972, the PTC Section
discussed and adopted a total of seven resolutions favoring a uniform trade
secrets act.96 In August 1972, at the Annual Meeting of NCCUSL held in San
Francisco, the proposed UTSA (in the form of the Seventh Working Draft)
received its first reading.
According to a verbatim transcript of the first reading of the UTSA,
the focus of the NCCUSL Commissioners' early discussions was on four
broad policy questions. First, after noting that trade secrets are protected
both by principles of tort and contract law, the question was raised whether
the UTSA should be limited to dealing with tort theories of liability. 9 9 Next,
input was sought on the extent to which the UTSA should deal with liability
arising from confidential relationships, particularly to the extent that such

9
Letter from Allison Dunham, Executive Director of NCCUSL, to Albert F.
James, Jr. (July 30, 1969) ("Professor Richard Dole of the University of Iowa prepared a study
report for this committee which has just been circulated to the chairman of the
committee. ... The reporter, Richard Dole, has just been made a Commissioner from Iowa
which may present some awkwardness in his being reporter for another Commissioner.").
96
See TRADE SECRETS, INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS, AND RELATED MATTERS,
1973 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 179 (report
of Henry E. Otto, Jr., Chairman, Subcomm. C) [hereinafter TRADE SECRETS 1973, SUBCOMM.
C REPORT] (attaching "Revised Draft (3/5/73) of the Proposed Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Proposed by Subcommittee C of the ABA Patent Section Committee 402").
9
Transcript of Proceedings of the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws, Annual Conference in its 81st Year, Uniform Trade Secrets Protection
Act, The Stanford Court, San Francisco, California (August 4-11, 1972) [hereinafter
Transcript of Proceedings, 81st Year, Uniform Trade Secrets].
99
Id.
99 Id. at9.
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relationships do not involve trade secrets.' 0 0 The third policy question
concerned the level of intent or knowledge that should be required to impose
liability under the UTSA, particularly with respect to a person who obtained
information in good faith without knowledge of misappropriation.'o' The
final policy issue concerned the scope and length of injunctive relief,
specifically: "[T]o what extent should the person who stole [secret
information] before it became widely known be subject to sanctions after the
secret becomes widely known?" 02 In the Seventh Working Draft and the
UTSA as adopted, it was decided to focus on tort theories and leave contract
theories separate, not to include provisions that would impose liability based
upon confidential relationships that do not involve trade secrets, and to limit
the circumstances under which a third party could be held liable for
obtaining and subsequently using or disclosing information that was acquired
in good faith. 0 3
A question was also raised whether a uniform law was needed at all.
As a NCCUSL Commissioner explained: "Any time I approach a proposal
for legislation, my first question is: Which is better in this area, the common
law process or legislation?"'0 The answer to the question "why a uniform
law instead of common law" helps explain not only the purpose of the
UTSA, but its meaning and import. Professor Dole responded that he thought
the UTSA could resolve a number of abuses that were occurring under the
common law, and what he referred to as "the pre-emption problem."' 0 5 One
cited abuse was the practice in some courts of granting perpetual injunctions.
Another concerned the failure of some courts to require the identification of
information claimed to be a trade secret, particularly in an injunctive order.
Professor Dole also noted inconsistencies concerning the availability of
monetary damages and how they are measured. After studying the state of
trade secret law circa 1973, Committee 402 of the PTC concluded that "a
uniform act would be desirable to provide consistency of definition of trade
secret misappropriation and of the relief and defenses available, as well as a
uniform statute of limitations."l 0 6
00 Id. at 18.
101 Id. at 19; see Richard F. Dole, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act-Trends and

Prospects, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 409 (2010). Compare Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide
Fastener Co., 172 F. 2d 150 (2d. Cir. 1949), with Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co.,
87 F. 2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936) (demonstrating the conflicting approaches to the issue).
102 Transcript of Proceedings, 81st Year, Uniform Trade Secrets, supra note 97, at
22 (noting that because broad sanctions could be anti-competitive, it was proposed that
remedies be limited to a so-called "lead time injunction").
103 See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (1979).
'
Id. at 31, see also TRADE SECRETS 1973, SUBCOMM. C REPORT, supra note 96
(posing the question "whether it might be preferable to rely on common law rather than upon
a statutory solution in cases involving misappropriation").
105 Transcript of Proceedings, 81st Year, Uniform Trade Secrets, supra note 97, at
32; see also infra Part II.E (explaining that the "pre-emption problem" refers to the
implications of the Sears/Compcodecisions on state trade secret law).
'
TRADE SECRETS 1973, supra note 71, at 179.
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Although the precise details of all of the commentary and concerns
about the UTSA was not recorded, a review of the various drafts of the
UTSA and the record of relevant PTC and NCCUSL proceedings reveals
that, beyond the general desire for uniformity, the principal issues of concern
to both the practicing IP bar and the drafters of the UTSA were: 1. The
definition of a trade secret; 2. The meaning of misappropriation; 3. The
availability and scope of injunctive relief; 4. The nature and extent of
monetary relief, including punitive damages and attorney's fees; 5. The
treatment of trade secrets during litigation; and 6. The effect of the UTSA on
other principles of law. Significantly, although the commentary to the
Restatement First addressed many of these same issues, it was deemed
important for the UTSA to provide clearer and more predictable results by
substituting the Restatement First's guideposts with codified rules.

E. The Ghost of Sears/Compco: Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.
Following the first reading of the proposed UTSA in August of
1972, work on the project continued both at NCCUSL and the ABA, with
Committee 402 of the PTC and Professor Dole preparing revised drafts of
the UTSA that were sent to the Special Committee for consideration in mid
1973.107 At that time, it was hoped that a final version of the proposed UTSA
could be presented to the NCCUSL Commissioners for adoption at their
annual meeting in August 1974. With the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.10 8 In May 1973, however, the
entire project was put on hold due to doubts about the ability of states to
legislate in the area of trade secret law. 09
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Kewanee was the third in a series of
post-Sears/Compco cases that created doubt about the continued viability of
claims for trade secret misappropriation based upon state law.110 The first
was the U.S. Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, in which
the Court overturned the well-established doctrine of licensee estoppel and
held that patent licensees could challenge the validity of patents that were the

107

Letter to William H. Adams, III from Joseph McKeown (April 13, 1973);

TRADE SECRETS 1973, SUBCOMM. C REPORT, supra note 96; Letter to Special Committee

Members from Joseph McKeown (July 5, 1973)).
108
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F. 2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
109
TRADE SECRETS 1973, SUBcoMM. C REPORT, supra note 96, at 179 ("The future
of our efforts and those of the National Conference with respect to the promulgation and
adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act will remain in doubt unless and until the Congress
enacts legislation negating any federal intent to preempt state causes of action for unfair
competition."). See also TRADE SECRETS 1974, supra note 71, at 252 (noting that no activity
was taken with respect to the UTSA pending the outcome of the Kewanee case).
110 See Roger M. Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matter,
46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 17 (1971); Joseph P. Zammit, The Ghost of Sears-Compco Is Finally Laid
to Rest (Or is It?), 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 37 (1975).
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subject of their licenses."' The second case was the decision in Painton &
Company, Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., in which a District Court refused to enforce
the trade secret provisions of a manufacturing agreement, finding a conflict
with patent policy.11 2 When the District Court's decision in Painton was
overruled by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1971, the practicing bar
breathed a sigh of relief."' For over two years thereafter, it was assumed that
trade secret law could co-exist with patent law. That assumption changed
when the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its decision in Kewanee.
Although the trial court in Kewanee had refused to find that trade
secret law was preempted by patent law, the Court of Appeals reversed and,
in so doing, explicitly rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Painton.14 Because the Court found that the subject information
was patentable, it held that the enforcement of trade secret laws with respect
to such information would unduly conflict with the patent policies of the
United States."' 5 In this way, the Court effectively limited the period of time
in which trade secret licenses could be enforced to the period ending one
year after the trade secrets were first disclosed to a licensee-that is, the
period of time that patent law allows for the filing of a timely patent
application after the first public use or sale ofan invention.I, 6
With the conflicting decisions and reasoning of the Circuit Courts in
Kewanee and Painton, the circumstances were ripe for the U.S. Supreme
Court to decide whether state trade secret law was preempted by federal
patent law. Although the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Kewanee is often
cited for the proposition that state trade secret law is not preempted by U.S.
patent law, it is more accurate to recognize that only the narrow version of
trade secret law described in that case is not preempted."' 7 Because there was
great fear among the business community and the practicing bar that trade
secret law would be preempted by federal law, the appellants in Kewanee
and many amici repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of trade secret law
under Ohio common law. For instance, in the amicus curiae brief of the
11 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).

Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F. 2d. 216, 221 (2d Cir.1971).
Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 478 F. 2d. 1074, 1086-87 (6th Cir. 1972) (citing
Servo Corp. of Am. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964); Water Servs., Inc. v.
Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Painton & Co. Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 442
F.2d 216 (2nd Cir. 1971)) ("We recognize that our holding in this case is in conflict with the
previously cited decisions of other Circuits . .. but our analysis of the relationship between the
Patent Laws of the United States and the Trade Secret Laws of the State of Ohio, as applied in
this case, forces us to the conclusion that the field of protection afforded to this plaintiff by
that Trade Secret Law has been preempted by the Patent Laws of the United States.")
(emphasis added).
"' Id. at 1079.
116 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
11
Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of
Intellectual Property Law to Determine the Issue of FederalPreemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL.
112

"
114

PROP. L. REv. 301, 333-53 (2008).
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American Bar Association-filed at the urging of the PTC-it was argued:
The trade secret law of Ohio, and that of all other states,
provides a type of protection for these secrets which is
distinctly different from the monopoly obtained under the
patent laws.

. .

. [T]he owner of a trade secret only has (1)

the right to prevent those who have stolen the secret from
him from disclosing or using it, and (2) the right to prevent
others from disclosing or using it in breach of contract or by
violation of a fiduciary relationship. It is impossible, for
example, for the owner of such a trade secret to assert any
"trade secret" right against any person who independently
develops the same secret.'
The strategy of emphasizing the limited scope of trade secret
protection paid off. In ruling that Ohio's trade secret law did not interfere
with federal patent policies, the Kewanee Court repeatedly referenced such
limits. First, the Court noted that for information to be protected by trade
secret law, it must be secret and not "of public knowledge or of a general
knowledge in the trade or business.""'9 In keeping with the arguments of the
ABA, it also recognized that there are only two types of wrongs that trade
secret law seeks to remedy: (1) the disclosure or use of a trade secret by one
who is "under the express or implied restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse";
and (2) the disclosure or use of a trade secret after it has been obtained by
"improper means," including theft, wiretapping and aerial reconnaissance.12 0
Finally, the Court emphasized that trade secret protection is limited by the
fact that it "does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest
means, such as by the independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by socalled reverse engineering." 1 21
F. Resumption and Completion of UTSA Drafting Efforts
After the Supreme Court's decision in Kewanee, efforts to craft a
uniform trade secrets act were resumed in late 1975, first at the ABA and
"
Brief Amicus Curia of the American Bar Assoc., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 1973 WL 17240 (Nov. 20, 1973) (No. 73-187) (referring to what is now the
misappropriation prong of the UTSA); see SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS: TRADE SECRETS AND
RELATED MATTER, 1973 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP.
§ 402, at 141 (Beverly A. Vandenburgh, ed.); Memorandum to ABA Board of Governors, re:
Amicus Curiae Brief (July 1973).
"' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (citing B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ohio 1963); National Tube Co. v. Eastern
Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C. Dec. 459, 462 (Ohio C.C. 1902)).
120
Id. at 475-76; compare pre-Kewanee versions of draft Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (1979) (demonstrating that the drafters of the UTSA had
the statement from Kewanee in mind when they renewed their efforts to adopt a Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, as the definition of "misappropriation" changed from the formative stages
to a detailed definition).
121 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
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later at NCCUSL.1 2 2 Interestingly, the Court's earlier decision in the 1973
case of Goldstein v. Californiaapparently prompted further examination of a
question that was raised during the first reading of the UTSA in 1972specifically, whether the draft UTSA should "be broadened to include
misappropriation of non-confidential intellectual property as well as
misappropriation of trade secrets."l 23 For a number of reasons, it was decided
that attention should focus on the adoption of the UTSA and not on a broader
law designed to protect business information that does not meet the
definition of a trade secret. Chairperson Richard Dole noted:
[A] majority of Subcommittee A believes that this ambitious
[broadened] project unnecessarily could delay the
promulgation of uniform state legislation concerning trade
secret protection with respect to which greater consensus
exists, could conflict with present copyright laws, and may
not be feasible in view of pending copyright revision
legislation which is likely to preempt expressly certain state

remedies.124
Thus, the PTC encouraged NCCUSL to direct its attention to the
"expeditious refinement and promulgation of a UTSA," noting that issues
still remained regarding the definitions of "trade secret" and
"misappropriation," and legitimate defenses.125
Beginning in 1976, updated drafts of the UTSA began to circulate
among members of the PTC and NCCUSL.1 26 In August of 1976, both the
PTC and NCCUSL voted to proceed with the completion of a uniform trade
secrets act.127 There followed preparation and consideration of multiple
additional drafts of the UTSA, beginning with a July 31, 1977 draft titled
"First Tentative Draft" and continuing through more than six iterations. In
June of 1978, the Review Committee established by NCCUSL to consider
122
Letter from Professor Richard Dole to the PTC, Committee 402 (December 31,
1975); Letter from Dean Lindsay Cowen to Members of the Special Committee on the
Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act (March 19, 1976) ("Late last summer the Special
Committee on Uniform Trade Secrets Protection was in a sense reorganized and we were
charged with moving forward on a draft for conference consideration. . . . In the meanwhile,
Dick Dole, who remains a member of our Committee, has continued his very active
participation in the work of the ABA Section of Patent Trademark and Copyright Law,
serving as Chairperson of Subcommittee A of Committee 402. Dick has also been appointed
by the ABA as its liaison with our Committee.").
123
Proposed Report of Richard F. Dole, Jr., Chairperson, Subcommittee A of
Committee 402 of the PTC Section, at 4 (February 6, 1976); see also Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973) (holding that because U.S. Copyright law did not (then) protect sound
recordings, California was free to enact state laws to protect such content).
124
Proposed Report of Richard F. Dole, Jr., Chairperson, Subcommittee A of
Committee 402 of the PTC Section, at 4 (February 6, 1976).
125 Id. at 6.
126
Letter of Richard F. Dole, Jr. to Members of Subcommittee A of the PTC
(February 6, 1976).
127
Report of Dean Lindsey Cowen, Chairman of the Special Committee of
NCCUSL; Letter from George G. Keely of NCCUSL to Lindsey Cowen (August 20, 1976).
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the readiness of the draft UTSA determined that it was ready for a first
reading before the Committee of the Whole.12 8 Thus, although a draft UTSA
had already received its first reading in 1972, the new and improved draft
UTSA ("the Sixth Tentative Draft") received a first reading at NCCUSL's
annual meeting in August of 1978.129
The transcript of the 1978 first reading reveals that all four of the
policy issues that were raised in 1972 had been resolved in the intervening
six years. With respect to the issue of whether the UTSA should be limited to
dealing with tort theories of liability or also deal with contract theories, it
was decided that the UTSA should focus on tort theories.130 On the issue of
whether the UTSA should deal with confidential relationships, it was decided
that confidential relationships were only relevant under the UTSA to the
extent they involve trade secrets-that is, where a breach of a confidentiality
agreement is the basis for a finding of misappropriation.131 The third issue
concerning the liability, if any, of a person who acquires trade secrets
innocently was resolved by providing for limited relief in the form of an
injunction, but only if there was no material change in position on the part of
the one who innocently acquired the trade secrets.13 2 Lastly, on the issue of
available remedies in the event of an act of misappropriation followed by the
trade secret becoming generally known, it was decided that an injunction
should issue for at least the length of defendant's lead-time advantage.133
The focus of the 1978 first reading thereafter turned to the purpose
and meaning of various provisions of the draft Act.134 Based upon the
commentary that was received during the 1978 reading, a Seventh Tentative
Draft (including notes and comments) of the proposed Act was prepared in
March 1979 and distributed to the Special Committee and the Review
Committee.135 Ultimately, although questions were raised about a number of
provisions of the proposed Act, the status of the UTSA drafting process was
deemed sufficient to proceed with the preparation of a "Draft for Approval"
Letter from Maurice Hartnett, III to John C. Deacon, Chairman of NCCUSL
(June 13, 1978).
129
Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Uniform Trade Secrets
Protection Act (August 3, 1978) [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the
Whole].
130 Id. at 6.
131 Id. at 6; Trade Secrets, Interference with Contracts, and Related Matters, 1976
A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 33, at 4 (report of Richard
F. Dole, Jr., Chairperson, Comm. 402, Subcomm. A) ("A majority of Subcommittee A [of
Committee 402 of the PTC] recommended that the Section encourage the National
Conference to direct its attention to the expeditious refinement and promulgation of a Uniform
Trade Secrets Act which leaves to the common law and other state and federal legislation the
actionability of misappropriation of nonconfidential intellectual property.").
132
Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 7.
'33
id.
114 See infra Part III.
13s Letter from Lindsey Cowen to Members of the Special Committee (March 30,
1979).
128
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that was presented to and approved by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in
August 1979.136 The August 1979 version of the UTSA, therefore, represents
the culmination of over thirteen years of study and work by scores of
attorneys and policy makers.
IV. THE PURPOSE AND MEANING OF THE UTSA
Although the initial impetus behind the UTSA was the desire to
solve the ErielSears/Compcosqueeze, the preparation of a proposed uniform
law allowed the drafting committee to consider various ways to improve
trade secret law as developed at common law. Ultimately, the UTSA
enhanced or truncated the common law development of trade secret law in at
least six ways: (1) it provided a precise and limited definition of a trade
secret; (2) it excluded protection for business information not meeting the
definition of a trade secret; (3) it focused attention on the need of a trade
secret claimant to prove both the existence of a trade secret and one or more
acts of misappropriation; (4) it clarified the availability and scope of
remedies, including injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees;
(5) it recognized the value of protective orders during trade secret litigation;
and (6) it explicitly preempted other common law causes of action designed
to provide remedies for the misuse of business information.
A. The Definition of a Trade Secret
A principal area of concern relating to the practicing bar's desire for
uniformity was the common law definition-or lack of a definitive
definition-of a trade secret.13 7 In a 1963 article published in The Business
LawKyer, Mathias Correa explained:
At the threshold of any discussion of the "protection" of
trade secrets it seems most appropriate to define what the
term "trade secret" actually means. The term seems to imply
the existence of some sort of property and suggests that a
trade secret ought to be definable as such.

. .

. In fact,

however, this is rarely the case.
When the UTSA drafting process began in 1966, the Restatement
136 Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Sheraton-Harbor Island
Hotel, San Diego, California (August 6-7, 1979).
'3
See, e.g., P. J. Whelan, Trade Secrets-Problems of Acquisition, 1963 Bus.
LAW. 539, 540 (1963) ("On the question of what is a secret or when is knowledge a secret, the
courts are in disagreement. We also find a sharp difference between the various jurisdictions
on the question when a secret ceases to be a secret in the sense that the receiver is bound to
hold it in confidence and not use it without the permission of the discloser.").
138 Mathias Correa, Protection of Trade Secrets, 1963 Bus. LAW. 531 (1963)
(noting the tendency of courts in trade secret cases to focus on the wrongful behavior of the
defendants instead of the existence or non-existence of a trade secret).
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First did not have a definitional provision. Instead, lawyers and judges were
directed to consider a list of six non-exclusive factors to determine whether a
given set of information was deserving of protection.13 9 Some jurisdictions
held that no one factor was determinative and that the six factors could be
considered or not as judges saw fit, while other jurisdictions required
sufficient proof of all six factors. 14 0 This led to inconsistency and
unpredictability regarding the protectable status of information, both from
the perspective of an information owner who wanted to know if he or she
owned trade secrets, and from an individual who needed to know if he or she
could use information in his or her possession.14 1
Under the UTSA, the Restatement First's non-exclusive, amorphous,
and optional list of trade secret factors is replaced by three specific and
mandatory requirements.1 42 First, to be protected as a trade secret, the
information must be secret which, in the parlance of the UTSA, means not
generally known or readily ascertainable. Second, the information must
derive independent economic value from not being generally known. Third,
the information must be subject to efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. Significantly, although each of the
three requirements of a trade secret incorporate concepts from the
Restatement First's list of six factors (see' Chart A below), the Restatement
factor that examined the information-owner's investment in the creation and
collection of the information is irrelevant, except to the extent it relates to
19
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, cmt. b (1934) ("Some factors to be considered
in determining whether given information is one's trade secret: are (1) the extent to which
information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and other involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and his
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired
or duplicated.").
Compare Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d. 1195, 1201 (5th
140
Cir. 1986), and Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Wis. 1989) (holding
that "although all six elements of the Restatement's test are no longer required, the
Restatement requirements still provide helpful guidance in deciding whether certain materials
are trade secrets under our new definition"), and Consolidated Brands, Inc., v. Mondi, 635 F.
Supp. 152, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining that "[t]he weight given to each individual factor
will, of course, vary depending on the circumstances of a particular case. However, the last
factor will, in almost all instances, be the most significant of the six"), and In re Bass, 113
S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. 2003) (holding that "the party claiming a trade secret should not be
required to satisfy all six factors because trade secrets do not fit neatly into each factor every
time.") with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. P.O. Mkt., Inc., 66 S.W.3d 620, 630 (Ark. 2002), and
Carroon & Black-Rutter & Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 325 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1982), superseded
by Wis. STAT. § 134.90.
Compare Correa, supra note 138, at 531 (discussing the law relating to the
141
protection of trade secrets and lamenting the absence of a clear meaning of a trade secret),
with Whelan, supra note 137, at 539 (discussing "problems encountered by a company in
seeking to avoid situations from which liability might arise from the wrongful use of the trade
secrets of another").
142
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985) (providing the definition of trade secret).

522

HAMLINE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 33:493

whether the information is readily ascertainable.14 3 In other words, evidence
of the investment that was made to create information may be relevant to
show that the information cannot be easily recreated, but the other
requirements of trade secrecy must still be met-namely, the economic value
and reasonable efforts requirements.
CHART A:
Side-by-side comparison of the Restatement First factors
and UTSA requirements of trade secrecy
RESTATEMENT FIRST
FACTORS
1. The extent to which the
information is known outside the
claimant's business.
2. The extent to which it is known
by employees and others involved
in the business.
3. The extent of measures taken by
the claimant to guard the secrecy of
the information.
4. The value of the information to
the business and its competitors

5. The amount of effort or money
expended by the business in
developing the information.
6. The ease or difficulty with which
the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.

UTSA REQUIREMENTS
Not generally known (UTSA
§1(4)(i))
Not generally known and subject to
reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy UTSA §1(4))
Subject to reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy (UTSA §1(4)(ii))
Derives independent economic
value from not being generally
known or readily ascertainable
(UTSA § 1(4)(i))

Readily ascertainable by proper
means
(UTSA §1(4)(i))

The foregoing limitation on the value of a trade secret owner's
investment in the creation of information is consistent with Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., in which the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the sweat of the brow doctrine.'" As the
Feist Court explained: "It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the
compiler's labor may be used by others without compensation.

...

This

result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright
advances the progress of science and art."1 45 From the perspective of trade
secret law, the mere fact that someone went to the time, trouble, and expense
143 See generally Dole, The Unform Trade Secrets Act, supra note 101.
'"
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991).
145 Id. at 349-50.
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to gather information-or even to create it-does not make it a protectable
trade secret. Under the UTSA, information that took little time and energy to
create (e.g., the proverbial "spark of genius") can be protected to the same
extent as information that is derived from years of painstaking research, but
only if it satisfies the three mandatory requirements of the UTSA's definition
of a trade secret, as further explained infra.14 6
1. The Requirement of Secrecy
As recognized repeatedly in Supreme Court cases, state unfair
competition laws cannot protect matters of public knowledge.14 7 The UTSA
definition of a trade secret goes one step further by emphasizing that even
when information is not known by the general public it cannot be a trade
secret if it is generally known within an industry. 148 The fact that an
information owner expended a lot of time, money, and energy to compile
information into a comprehensive form cannot transform information that is
generally known into a trade secret. Parts of the compilation may be
protected by copyright law, but to establish trade secret protection for
information, the owner of the information must establish that it is not
generally known by both the public and members of the relevant industry.149
The UTSA further requires that the information not be readily ascertainable
by proper means.so Generally, whether information is readily ascertainable
depends upon how easy it is to find the information without reference to the

See infra notes 147-167 and accompanying text.
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156-57
(1989) ("[S]tate law that interferes with the enjoyment of [free trade in publicly
known] ... unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions ... contravenes the ultimate goal of
[patent law of] public disclosure and use that is the centerpiece of federal patent policy.");
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) ("[T]hat which is in the public
domain cannot be removed therefrom by action of the States."); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 663, 668 (1969) (noting that the doctrine of patent licensee estoppel was created "before
the Sherman Act made it clear that the grant of monopoly power to a patent owner constituted
a limited exception to the general federal policy favoring free competition" and that "federal
law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they
are protected by a valid patent").
UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985) ("The language "not being
148
generally known to and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons"
does not require that information be generally known to the public for trade secret rights to be
lost. If the principal persons who can obtain economic benefit from [the] information are
aware of it, there is no trade secret.").
149
See Renee Beauty Salons, Inc. v. Blose-Venable, 652 A.2d 1345, 1350 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (finding that a compilation of customer data was not a trade secret); Den-TalEz, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding a
compilation of information identifying railcar parts suppliers was not a trade secret).
150
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)); see also Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279,
1283 (Vt. 2001) (discussing the circumstances under which customer lists may be readily
ascertainable and noting, "the threshold amount of time and money that must be invested
before a customer list is accorded statutory protection varies considerably").
146
147
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alleged trade secrets.' 51 The comments to the UTSA explain: "Information is
readily ascertainable if it is available in trade journals, reference books, or
published materials." 5 2 Also, if the alleged secrets can be easily gleaned
from products that are on the market through reverse engineering or simple
observation, they are readily ascertainable. 53 In this regard, evidence of
"reverse engineering" may provide a defense to a claim of trade secret
misappropriation in two ways: (1) by establishing that the information is
readily ascertainable and, therefore, not a trade secret; and (2) by establishing
that the information was acquired properly and, therefore, that there was no
misappropriation.

2. The Economic Value Requirement
Establishing that information is actually secret (that is, not generally
known or readily ascertainable) is only the first step in proving the existence
of a protectable trade secret under the UTSA. The next step requires a
showing that the information has commercial value due to its secrecy. In the
parlance of the UTSA, the information must "derive independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known or readily
ascertainable by other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use."l5 4 Thus, the issue is not whether the asserted trade secrets
have value in the abstract, but whether they have value because they are
secret, and such secrecy makes them valuable to others. Professor Dole
explained this concept as follows: "A lot of mailing lists are not trade secrets.
They aren't important enough. They may be stamped 'secret,' but they may
not be sufficient to confer a competitive advantage and would not qualify as
trade secrets under our act."' 55
15 See SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2479 (5th ed., Oxford U. Press
2002) (defining "readily" as "without delay" or "without difficulty"); id. at 127 (defining
"ascertainable" as capable of being determined or learned). Id. at 127. See also Hamer
Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("[T]he key to
secrecy [under the Act] is the ease with which information can be developed through other
proper means: if the information can be readily duplicated without involving considerable
time, effort or expense, then it is not secret."); Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Crisp, 82 F.3d 785, 790
(8th Cir. 1996) ("Vigoro's two hundred farm store customers could be easily discovered
because the farm in a small geographic area.").
"
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.5.
15 id.
154 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i). See also Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret
Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545 (2010).
155 Transcript of Proceedings of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Trade Secrets Act, 8th Session, at 11 (August 5, 1985) [hereinafter
Transcript of Proceedings, 8th Session, Uniform Trade Secrets]. See also RogersCasey, Inc. v.
Nankof, No. 02-Civ.-2599, 2003 WL 1964049 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. April 24, 2003) (unpublished)
(citing Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1684, 1688
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (citing the economic-value requirement as a major impediment to
plaintiffs claim, explaining that the alleged trade secret information "derives its economic
value not from its secrecy, if any, but rather from its relevance to the needs of the particular
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The economic value requirement of the UTSA was not simply a
definitional flourish but was specifically designed to increase the plaintiffs
burden of proof in order to ensure that a claim for relief was not provided for
illusory information or information of little import.'56 The first draft of the
UTSA prepared by the PTC contained a tangibility requirement that would
have required trade secret plaintiffs to prove that their trade secrets had been
fixed in some tangible form. 5 7 The purpose of a tangibility requirement was
explained as follows:
You get into these cases, and the plaintiff tries to get strong
relief and disclose as little of what his real secret is as he
can; and the idea is that trade secret protection should not be
available unless, prior to misappropriation, the plaintiff has
provided an evidentiary embodiment of that which he seeks
protection for. 58
After it was pointed out that sometimes the worst way to protect a secret is to
write it down (as was the case with the Pentagon Papers that were then in the
news), the decision was made to delete the tangibility requirement."' Later,
when concern was raised that the absence of a tangibility requirement might
create rights in inchoate ideas, Professor Dole explained: "We did not mean
to grant protection to abstract ideas-period. An abstract idea wouldn't have
commercial value." 6 ln lieu of a tangibility requirement, the UTSA requires
proof of commercial value and reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.
As originally drafted, the economic value requirement used the term
"commercial value." Section 1(4) of the version of the UTSA that was
adopted by NCCUSL in 1979 reads:
(i) derives independent actual or potential commercial value
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its commercial use. ... 6
client")); Spring Indus., Inc. v. Nicolozakes, No. 99APl20075, 2000 WL 1751163 at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2000) (unpublished) (finding that the alleged trade secret information was of no
value to the defendant); Montgomery Cnty Assn. of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master
Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804, 814 (D. Md. 1995) (noting that the database "derives economic value
not from its secrecy, but from being widely distributed .... ); POOLEY, supra note 8, at

§ 4.05.
See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
See First Tentative Draft (Seventh Working Draft) of Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, § 1(2) (July 18, 1972) ("'[T]rade secret' means a scientific, technical, or commercial idea
or fact which is reduced to tangible form which is undisclosed or disclosed solely with express
or implied restrictions on its disclosure or use, and which confers an actual or potential
competitive advantage.") (emphasis added).
158 Transcript of Proceedings, 8th Session, Uniform Trade Secrets, supra note 97,
at 5.
159
Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 6; see
also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
160 Id. at 10.
161 UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT, as adopted in August of 1979 (emphasis added).
156
157
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The Review Committee had earlier agreed that "commercial value"
concept than "economic value," but both terms were still used. 162
a
better
was
Following the formal adoption of the UTSA in August 1979, NCCUSL's
Committee on Style-as is its purpose and practice-reviewed the language
of the UTSA for grammatical and style problems. Apparently noting
confusion or inartfulness in the use of both the terms "commercial" and
"economic," the Style Committee changed the foregoing language as
follows:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use ....
Apparently, the Committee on Style viewed the terms "commercial" and
"economic" as being synonymous. In light of this drafting history, the
economic value requirement can be read to include a requirement that the
alleged trade secret information be of value to others due to its actual or
potential commercial use.163

3. The Reasonable Efforts Requirement
The third part of the UTSA's definition of a trade secret requires that
the putative trade secret owner establish that the information is and has been
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to protect
its secrecy.' This is consistent with a number of early trade secret cases that
carefully examined the extent to which the claimant treated the information
as a secret.' 65
During consideration of the proposed UTSA in 1978, the reasonable
efforts requirement was cited in response to concerns that the UTSA might
be interpreted to impose liability on someone who acquired information as a
result of the trade secret owner's negligence.' 66
Mr. Haydock: Mr. Chairman, I have a question here. On
page 2, line 23, with reference to knowledge of a trade secret
that's acquired by mistake, I would be pleased to have a little
more indication of what you mean by "mistake."
Mr. Dole: I think we were thinking of the Restatement
Letter of Dean Lindsey Cowen to Henry E. Otto, Jr. (May 8, 1978).
Accord Relig. Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d. 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a commercial advantage must be shown and that the alleged spiritual advantage
was not enough).
Letter of Dean Lindsey Cowen to Henry E. Otto, Jr. (May 8, 1978).
16
16 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
165 See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (explaining that early trade
secret cases mandated there be a confidentiality agreement or some evidence that plaintiff
treated the information as a secret).
'66 Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 23.
162

163
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concept. Their illustrations typically involved misdelivered
memos and letters. If a person is negligent in maintaining
secrecy, under the definition of "trade secret"-if they are
negligent enough, that can forfeit [their] protection. So if the
negligence goes to reasonableness of the efforts to maintain
secrecy, you can lose protection. But if you just misdeliver
something you are trying to keep confidential, you can

impose liability.167
It is clear from the foregoing exchange that the drafters of the UTSA
did not intend to protect business information merely because an individual
or company had hoped or intended to keep it secret. Wishful thinking is not
enough. Rather, only information that is actually subject to reasonable
secrecy efforts meets the definition of a trade secret. What is "reasonable"
according to the UTSA depends upon the circumstances and is one area
under the UTSA where judges are free to exercise their traditional roles and
develop a common law meaning of reasonable efforts.
B. Eliminating Protection for Mere Business Information
By the time of the first reading of the Sixth Tentative Draft in
August 1978, the three requirements of a trade secret had emerged as the
preferred way of defining a trade secret and there was little debate among
NCCUSL Commissioners concerning the definition as written.168 Because
the drafters of the UTSA had the benefit of the U.S. Supreme Court's
reasoning in Kewanee, it must be assumed that they were aware of the
narrow scope of trade secret law that is described therein and that the UTSA
was written in a manner that is consistent with those parameters.16 9 Thus,
although the conventional wisdom is that the UTSA broadened the scope of
information that is protectable under trade secret law by deleting the
Restatement First's requirements that the protected information be nonephemeral and used in one's business, it really only broadened the classes of
information that, theoretically, can be protected. 1 0 By substituting three
Id. at 23. See also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, cmt. ("The type of accident
or mistake that can result in a misappropriation under Section 1(2)(ii)(C) involves conduct by
a person seeking relief that does not constitute a failure of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy under Section 1(4)(ii).").
168 See generally Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra
note 129.
169
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (explaining that Kewanee was
decided in 1974); see also supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining that the drafters
resumed work on the UTSA after the Supreme Court's decision in Kewanee).
Ho UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, cmt (1985) ("The definition of 'trade secret'
contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) which required that a
trade secret be 'continuously used in one's business.' The broader definition in the proposed
Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired means to
put a trade secret to use."); see also, MiLGRIM & BENSON supra note 20, § 1.02.
167
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clearly articulated trade secrecy requirements for a list of indeterminate trade
secrecy factors, the UTSA actually increased the burden that plaintiffs in
trade secret cases face when trying to establish the existence of a trade
secret. 17 1 In this way, the UTSA was designed to reduce the incidences where
courts would protect information without sufficient proof of secrecy. The
UTSA limited the scope of trade secret protection even further by refusing to
extend its coverage to mere confidential information that, under § 759 of the
Restatement First, could be protected if the confidential information was
acquired by improper means "for the purpose of advancing a rival business

interest."

72

As noted above, the question of the proper scope of the UTSA and
whether it should apply to a broader set of information than trade secrets
continually reappeared, like a bad penny, as an issue during the drafting
process.17 3 Each time the issue was raised, the decision was made to focus
the UTSA on claims related to actual trade secrets. Initially, that choice was
simply a question of preference, but as the Supreme Court's preemption
jurisprudence developed and Congress expanded the reach of U.S. copyright
law, the issue became one of substance. Apparently, the Supreme Court's
decision in Goldstein-in which it refused to hold that a California statute
protecting sound recordings was preempted by pre-1978 copyright lawsuggested to some that state law could be used to protect a wide variety of
information and intangible property rights.17 4 This possibility, however, was
short-lived given the subsequent enactment by Congress of the Sound
Recording Act and the 1976 Copyright Act and the U.S. Supreme Court's
75
decision in Feist.1
Although § 301 of the Copyright Act-the provision that defines the
extent to which U.S. copyright law preempts state law-suggests that some
state causes of action related to the protection of business information are not
preempted, the identification of those causes of action became more
complicated after 1976. The drafters of the UTSA did not want to delay
enactment of a uniform trade secret law while they figured out if and how
other forms of business information could be protected by state law.' 76 If the
1'
172

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (definition of "trade
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (1934).

1'

See supra notes 123-124, 137-138 and accompanying text.

174

See supra notes

secret").

1223Error! Bookmark not deflned.-1234

and

accompanying text.
's
See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. Law 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971); Pub.
Law 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1990) (amending this Act and making it permanent); Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); supranote
144 and accompanying text.
176 See 17 U.S.C. § 301; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text; Sandeen,
Kewanee Revisited, supra note 117, at 333-53 (explaining that since there are now two
comprehensive bodies of federal law that provide protection for information (patent and
copyright law), there is a greater likelihood that the efforts of common law courts or state
legislatures to protect business information that is not otherwise protected by patent or
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UTSA was to deal with all tort theories of liability, the PTC and NCCUSL
would have had to sort out a variety of common law causes of action that, in
one shape or another, previously gave relief for the misuse of business
information. Moreover, allowing for such claims with respect to information
that does not meet the UTSA's definition of a trade secret would destroy the
very uniformity and consistency that the UTSA was designed to promote.
Thus, it was decided that the UTSA should include a provision to preclude
alternative tort-based theories of liability. Consistent with the language of
§ 301 of the Copyright Act, while it is theoretically possible that a wrong
could be articulated that provides the "extra element" necessary to avoid
copyright preemption, § 7 of the UTSA requires the extra element to be
something other than the claimed wrongful acquisition, disclosure, or use of
business information. 177
C. The Definition of Misappropriation
As noted by the Supreme Court in Kewanee, one of the reasons that
the trade secret law of Ohio was not preempted by federal patent law was
because the applicable definition of a trade secret did not include information
that was already in the public domain.' 78 An equally important reason was
that proof of the existence and use of a trade secret, in and of itself, was not
sufficient to state a claim for trade secret misappropriation under Ohio
law.179 In addition, it must be shown either: (1) that the trade secret
information was used or disclosed in violation of a duty of confidentiality; or
(2) that the trade secret information was acquired by improper means.so In
this way, the "wrong" to be remedied is not simply the defendant's use of
trade secrets (as can be the case under patent and copyright law), but specific
additional actions deemed to constitute cognizable wrongs in the nature of
acts of unfair competition.'18
The UTSA's requirement that both the existence of a trade secret and
its misappropriation be proven in order to state a successful claim for trade
secret misappropriation is consistent with the common law development of
trade secret law, which generally required proof of a breach of duty or breach
of trust.'82 Unfortunately, in the same way that some courts did not always
copyright law will conflict with the federal policies underlying those laws).
1n Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 (1995)
(discussing limitations on claims for appropriating the other's tangible trade values). See also
Sharon K. Sandeen, Assessing the Protection of Information through Tort Law in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS,
ALTERNATIVES (Edward Elgar, Robert F. Brauneis, eds. 2009).
178 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

COPYRIGHT

See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
181 See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also 35 U.S.C.
(Infringement of Patent); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2002) (Infringement of Copyright).
182
See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
'
180

AND

ITS

§ 271 (2003)

HAMLINE LAWREVIEW

530

[Vol. 33:493

insist that a plaintiff in a trade secret case prove the existence of a trade
secret-thereby leading to calls for a more precise definition of a trade
secret--concerns were raised during the UTSA drafting process about the
failure of some courts to require proof of the existence of wrongdoing. To
remedy this problem, the drafters of the UTSA decided to define the
wrongdoing ("misappropriation") separately from a "trade secret," thereby
more clearly establishing that the existence of a trade secret alone is not
enough; the commission of a wrongful act must also be shown.' 83
The UTSA's definition of misappropriation was also used to specify
clearly the circumstances under which third parties who are not in privity
with a trade secret owner can be held responsible for trade secret
misappropriation. When this issue was first considered, the drafters of the
UTSA had three options. On one extreme, they could refuse to impose any
liability on third parties. On the other extreme, they could follow the model
of patent and copyright law and impose what is, in essence, a form of strict
liability; that is, the UTSA could have imposed liability for the mere
acquisition, disclosure, or use of trade secrets without requiring its
misappropriation. They chose an intermediate option and imposed liability
on third parties only upon acquisition of knowledge followed by a wrongful
act. There are four circumstances where this may occur:
1. Where a third party acquires a trade secret of another with
knowledge (or reason to know) that the trade secret was acquired by

improper means;184
2. Where a third party discloses or uses a trade secret of another with
knowledge (or reason to know) that his or her knowledge of the trade
secret was:
derived from or through a person who utilized
a.
.185
improper means to acquire it;
b.
derived from or through a person who owed a duty
to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy of
limit its use;18 or
before a material change of his or her position,
c.
knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret
and that knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident or mistake.' 87
Because the drafters of the UTSA did not want to impose liability on
innocent users of another's trade secrets, they were careful to require proof
of specific knowledge or a reason to know.' 88 They consciously chose,
however, to modify what was described as the "bona fide purchaser for
183
1894
185
186
187
18

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1985).
Id. § 1(2)(i).
Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B)(I).
Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B)(III).
Id. 1(2)(ii)(C).
Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 7.
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value" rule by enabling liability to be imposed for actions occurring after
adequate notice is given. As explained by Professor Dole, referring to § 2(d)
of the Sixth Tentative Draft:
The present law is pretty much a bona fide purchaser for
value type of arrangement, and if a person in good faith
obtains a trade secret and pays value for it, and later finds
out it's a trade secret, it's too bad as far as the original holder
of the trade secret is concerned.

. .

. This is an attempt to try

to create some remedy for the situation of the disgruntled
employee who creates a wind-fall for the competitor.18 9
Ultimately, § 2(d) was deleted from the draft UTSA but its
underlying concept of potential liability after notice was preserved in UTSA
§ 1(2). Pursuant to § 1(2)(i), a good-faith acquirer cannot be held liable for
the mere acquisition of trade secret information. He can only be liable for the
disclosure and use of trade secrets if: (1) adequate notice is received before
the disclosure or use; and (2) the trade secret status of the information was
not lost in the meantime.190 The UTSA also states a preference for limiting
the remedies that can be awarded against such "good-faith
misappropriators," as discussed infra.9 '
D. Remedies
Due to the traditional separation of courts of law and equity and
traditional notions of compensable harm, plaintiffs in early unfair
competition cases often found it difficult to obtain remedies, either in the
form of damages or injunctive relief. The problem on the damages front was
the frequent inability of the plaintiff to prove actual damages by showing
that, but for the activities of the defendant, plaintiffs profits would have
increased. This was particularly true where the defendant was not a direct
competitor of the trade secret owner. With respect to a request for injunctive
relief, the problem in early cases was often the nature of the claim and the
limited availability of injunctive relief. Early courts that wanted to award
injunctive relief often solved these problems with respect to trade secret
claims by either characterizing the wrong as a breach of confidentiality or
trust or by categorizing the trade secret as a property right.192
One of the benefits of legislative enactments over the common law is
that federal and state legislatures are not bound by common law rules
"9 Id. at 40, § 2(d) ("Although not otherwise a misappropriator, if necessary to
prevent a manifest injustice, a person who in good faith has derived knowledge of a trade
secret from a misappropriator is liable for a reasonable royalty to the extent of gain obtained
from disclosure to others or use of the trade secret of another.").
190 Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 31
(noting the risk of loss of trade secret rights due to wide-spread dissemination of trade secrets
following their initial misappropriation).
191 See infra notes 192-202 and accompanying text.
192
See supra note 25-27 and accompanying text.
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regarding remedies. In enacting laws that establish new causes of action,
legislators are free to define both the wrongdoing that will give rise to relief
and the scope and nature of available relief. Often legislators choose to
follow common law principles that define the circumstances for the grant of
various remedies, but where they believe such remedies are inadequate, they
are free to deviate from common law principles. As noted previously, the
desire for clearer and better remedies was one of the principal motivating
factors behind the UTSA.1 93
At the time that the UTSA was drafted, the willingness of federal
legislators to deviate from common law norms when fixing remedies for
patent and copyright infringement was well known to the practicing bar.1 94 In
fact, the remedies provisions of the McClellan Bill were modeled after U.S.
patent and copyright law.' 95 Thus, it is not surprising that the practicing bar
saw an opportunity to use the device of a uniform law to define the remedies
that would be available for trade secret misappropriation.196 The drafters of
the UTSA followed the model of federal patent and copyright law by: (1)
providing for an award of damages and broadly defining how damages could
be measured; (2) specifically providing for the grant of injunctive relief to
prevent either actual or threatened trade secret misappropriation; and (3)
providing for the award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees in special

cases.197
Although it may have been tempting to draft the remedies provisions
to benefit trade secret owners, the drafters of the UTSA took a more
balanced approach, recognizing that businesses might find themselves on
either side of a trade secret misappropriation claim. This is seen most clearly
in the limitations that were placed on the award of punitive damages and in
the requirements for the award of attorney's fees and injunctive relief. '9 An
award of exemplary damages is capped at "twice any award made under
subsection (a)" of § 3. Attorney's fees can only be granted to the prevailing
party in the case of bad faith pleading or willful and malicious
misappropriation.' 99 The bad faith provision of § 4, in particular, was cited as
"an effort to chill wrongful assertion of rights under the Act., 200

See supra notes 62, 106 and accompanying text.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 281-289; 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505.
195 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
196 Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 28
(noting that one of the problems with the Restatement First is that it does not discuss
remedies).
19 Compare UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT, §§ 3-4 (1985), with PATENT ACT, 35
U.S.C. §§ 283-285, and COPYRIGHT ACT of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505.
198 Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 21
(noting that the UTSA was designed to eliminate the concept of permanent injunction and
noting "[s]o to some degree the Act attempts to create a balance, and to some degree limit the
amount of protection that is afforded for a trade secret").
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4.
'"
200 Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 29.
193

194
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While courts are given broad powers under the UTSA to grant
injunctive relief against actual or threatened misappropriation, the definition
of misappropriation was designed to ensure that injunctions would not be
imposed against good-faith acquirers of a misappropriated trade secret (those
without knowledge or a reason to know of the misappropriation). 20 ' Further,
for those good-faith acquirers who might become misappropriators because
they are timely informed of the alleged trade secret misappropriation, § 2(b)
of the UTSA states a preference for the payment of a reasonable royalty
instead of a prohibitory injunction, and § 3(a) limits the award of monetary
relief in the case of a material and prejudicial change of position.2 02
E. The Treatment of Trade Secrets in Litigation
Sometimes statutory enactments are preferred in order to deviate
from common law norms, as was the case with the remedies provisions of
the UTSA. Other times statutes are needed because the common law is illequipped to deal with a unique issue. Such appears to be the case with
respect to § 5 of the UTSA, which addresses the treatment of trade secrets in
litigation and proved to be a non-controversial aspect of the UTSA.203
Because, by definition, trade secrets must be kept relatively secret in order to
be protectable, and court proceedings are generally open to the public, any
time a trade secret owner initiates a trade secret misappropriation claim there
is a risk that the trade secrets will be lost in the process. To reduce this risk,
the drafters of the UTSA included a provision that gives courts broad powers
to preserve the secrecy of alleged trade secrets during litigation, including
the power to issue protective orders.
F. Preemption of Other Tort Theories of Liability
In addition to having to solve the preemption problem that was
addressed in Kewanee, the drafters of the UTSA confronted another
preemption problem, or what is more appropriately labeled an overlapping
cause of action problem. As noted above, at the time the UTSA drafting
process began, trade secret law was a hodge-podge of theories and causes of
action.2 04 In order to bring order to this chaos, the UTSA was proposed.
However, the UTSA would not accomplish its central mission if the (often
inexact and incomplete) legal theories and causes of action that preceded it
were allowed to co-exist. Thus, what ultimately became § 7 of the UTSA
201 See infra notes 216-233 and accompanying text (discussing the 1985
Amendments to the UTSA).
202 See Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at
29; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3, cmt.; accord Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide
Fastener Co., 172 F. 2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
203 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5, cmt.
204 See supra notes 43, 82 and accompanying text.
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(Effect on Other Law) was proposed.
As originally written, § 7 (then § 6) stated that the UTSA would be
"the exclusive state tort remedy for trade secret misappropriation," but that
its preclusive effect would not apply to: (1) criminal penalties for trade secret
misappropriation; (2) tort liability for misappropriation that is not based upon
the existence of a trade secret; and (3) contractual obligations.205 Like § 5 of
the UTSA, this provision was non-controversial. While questions arose about
how it should be worded, there was no dispute about the desirability of such
a section or its basic intent. During the reading of the draft UTSA in 1978,
when asked to explain the conflicting law that would be excluded by § 6(a),
Professor Dole stated:
Well, I would gather it would be a type of law that imposes
liability for trade secret misappropriation that had a different
definition or [sic] trade secret or a different definition of
misappropriation. The basic categories would be tort law, or
for
liability
law,
that
imposed
quasi-contract
misappropriating something that's a trade secret. 206
The problem with the last sentence of the foregoing quote is that pre-existing
theories of trade secret liability did not always use an adequate definition of a
trade secret, and what constituted misappropriation was not necessarily coextensive with the definition set forth in the UTSA.20 7 It makes more sense to
follow the logic of the first sentence and realize that in light of complaints
concerning the uneven common law development and application of trade
secret law, § 7 was intended to preclude all other state-based tort claims for
the protection of "proprietary" or "confidential" information. Otherwise, the
UTSA's goal of preventing the over-assertion of trade secret rights could be
avoided by the simple expedient of claiming an independent right to protect
information that does not qualify for trade secret protection. As noted above,
this approach would also conflict with the preemption provisions of U.S.
copyright law.208
Section 7 of the UTSA is perhaps best understood in light of a
that is part of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
provision
similar
(UDTPA), which was adopted by NCCUSL in 1966.209 Section 2(c) of the
UDTPA provides, "This section does not affect unfair trade practices

205

31, 1977).

Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act, First Tentative Draft § 6, at 5-6 (July

Transcript of Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, supra note 129, at 9.
See also Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Sixth Tentative Draft (July 28, 1978) (the
draft was changed to read: "This Act displaces conflicting common law and statutes pertaining
to actionable trade secret misappropriation."). See also, John T. Cross, UTSA Displacement of
Other State Law Claims, 33 HAMLINEL. REv. 445 (2010).
208
See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
209
Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law at its Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada
(July 30-August 5, 1966).
206
207
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otherwise actionable at common law or under other statutes of this state." 210
The drafters of the UTSA could have followed the language of the UDTPA
and specifically allowed for the continued common law development of
theories of liability related to business information not meeting the definition
of a trade secret, but chose not to do so.211 Instead, they stated a clear intent
to restrict the further development of common law theories for the protection
of business information. If either the existence of a trade secret or an act of
misappropriation (as defined by the UTSA) cannot be shown, then no theory
of liability, other than one based upon breach of contract, is allowed.2 12
The purpose of § 7 of the UTSA must also be understood in light of
the development and application of the Sears/Compco doctrine.2 13 As
detailed supra, while the Kewanee Court held that trade secret law was not
preempted by federal law, it did so based upon a narrow view of trade secret
law and, in the process, indicated that state laws that attempt to protect
business information that is not secret or is not misappropriated would face
preemption problems.2 14 Section 7 is not only consistent with Kewanee, it is
one of the means by which the UTSA solved "the preemption problem." 2 15
G. The History of the 1985 Amendments to the UTSA
Given the length of the UTSA drafting process and the long-term
and extensive involvement of the practicing bar in that process, it is perhaps
surprising that any objections to the Act would be voiced, let alone so soon
after its adoption in 1979. After NCCUSL adopted the UTSA at its annual
meeting in August of 1979, a number of states moved quickly to enact it into
law. In August 1980, Minnesota became the first state to pass legislation
adopting the UTSA, followed closely by Idaho, Arkansas, Kansas, and
Louisiana.2 16 Soon thereafter, however, the UTSA hit a snag in the form of
opposition engineered by William LaFuze, an attorney from Houston and an
210

Id.

Professor Dole was also involved with the drafting of the UDPA and, thus, was
presumably aware of its provision that specifically allowed for the continued common law
development of unfair trade practices law.
212 Accord ITT Schadow Inc. v. Stein, 7 U.S.P.Q. 1348 (D. Minn. 1988). See also,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38, cmt. a (1995) ("The law of unfair
competition imposes liability only in connection with particular methods of competition that
undermine rather than advance the competitive process .... The primary source of
protection for intangible trade values are the federal patent and copyright laws.").
213 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Sears/Compco
doctrine).
214
See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text (discussing the Kewanee
holding).
215
See supra note 105 and accompanying text. The UTSA also solved the
preemption problem by narrowly defining the scope of trade secret protection.
211

21

See MINN. STAT. ANN.

(2010); ARK. CODE ANN.

§§

325C.01-.08 (2010); IDAHO CODE

§§

48-801-807

§§ 4-75-601-607 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320-3330

(2010); LA. STAT. ANN.-REv. STAT.

§§ 51:1431-1439

(2010).
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active member of the Intellectual Property Law Section of the State Bar of
Texas, the PTC Section, and the American Patent Law Association.2 17
On July 3, 1981, the Intellectual Property Section of the State Bar of
Texas, at the apparent urging of Mr. LaFuze, passed a series of resolutions
that, while favoring a uniform trade secrets act in principle, opposed
adoption of the 1979 version of the UTSA.218 Despite its past and extensive
involvement in the UTSA drafting process, similar resolutions were
thereafter adopted by the PTC on August 8, 1981 .219 The Unfair Competition
Committee of the American Patent Law Association followed suit in a series
of resolutions that were put to a vote in December 1981 .220 The principal
concerns of the three groups related to the issue of remedies.
First, with respect to § 7 of the 1979 version of the UTSA, concern
was expressed that the language did not make it clear that the UTSA would
not preclude breach of contract claims and associated contract remedies.
Second, although the possibility of a grant of reasonable royalties was
mentioned in the injunction section of the 1979 version of the UTSA (§ 2),
concern was expressed that reasonable royalties should also be listed as a
possible alternative measure of damages in the damages section (§ 3).221
Third, concern was expressed about the remedies available against goodfaith misappropriators. Although Mr. LaFuze and his cohorts wanted to give
courts the flexibility to grant damages measured by reasonable royalties, they
wanted to allow such remedies against good-faith misappropriators only in
"exceptional circumstances."22 2
The fact that the UTSA was ultimately amended in 1985 is a
testament to the value of persistence and determination. Although the initial
response of NCCUSL was to suggest that there were no problems with the
language of the 1979 version of the UTSA and, in any event, it had been
fully vetted by the practicing bar, Mr. LaFuze would not relent in his mission
to amend the UTSA.
First, he cobbled together an argument that the practicing bar was
not in full support of the UTSA, as evidenced by the aforementioned
resolutions and a June 1979 critique of the draft UTSA by the Unfair
Competition Committee of the American Patent Law Association.223 Next,
See infra notes 223-224, 226-227 and accompanying text (discussing relevant
correspondence from Mr. LaFuze).
218
Resolutions of the Intellectual Property Law Section, State Bar
of Texas,
regarding the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, approved July 3, 1981.
219
Resolutions of the Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section, American Bar
Association, regarding the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, approved August 8, 1981.
220
See Resolutions of the Unfair Competition Committee of the American Patent
Law Association (November 19, 1981); Resolutions of the Unfair Competition Committee of
the American Patent Law Association, regarding Results of Voting (December 7, 1981).
221
Resolutions of the Intellectual Property Law Section, State Bar of Texas,
regarding the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Resolution No. 6 (July 3, 1981).
222
id
223
Letter of William LaFuze to James Showers (December 5, 1981); see also
217
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he insisted on meeting with Professor Dole and NCCUSL Commissioner
James Showers, both residents of Texas, to discuss the matter.22 4 That
meeting led Professor Dole to prepare proposed amendments to the UTSA in
1982.225 When NCCUSL was not quick to amend the UTSA, Mr. LaFuze
apparently convinced the Unfair Competition Committee of the American
Patent Law Association to pursue federal trade secret legislation and used the
threat of such legislation to try to convince NCCUSL to amend the UTSA. 226
Finally, when that strategy did not work, Mr. LaFuze wrote to the Governors
of various states to inform them, "the primary organized bars which first
supported the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by the states have
withdrawn their support." 2 27
Although it was an overstatement for Mr. LaFuze to argue that the
major bar associations withdrew their support of the UTSA since the
aforementioned resolutions were only approved by relatively small
committees of such associations, his letters to the Governors were apparently
the last straw that caused NCCUSL to actually amend the UTSA. The fear,
of course, was that Mr. LaFuze had created enough smoke that NCCUSL's
efforts to convince additional states to adopt the UTSA would be hampered.
There followed additional meetings and discussions between Mr. LaFuze and
representatives of NCCUSL and the development of several proposed
amendments to the UTSA.228
Amendments to § 7 were designed to make it clear (or clearer) that
the UTSA was not intended to interfere with claims for breach of contract
and associated contractual remedies. In this regard, it was felt that use of the
word "remedy" was better than use of the word "liability." 22 9 Amendments to
§ 3 were proposed in order to make it explicit that reasonable royalties could
be used as an appropriate measure of damages under the UTSA when "actual
loss" and "unjust enrichment" could not be proved.23 0 Conversely, the
amendments to § 2(b) were designed to limit the use of reasonable royalties
Letter of William LaFuze to Professor Richard F. Dole (March 4, 1982).
224
Letter of William LaFuze to Joseph DeGrandi, President of the Patent,
Trademark & Copyright Section of the American Bar Association (January 8, 1982).
225
Letter of Richard F. Dole to John McCabe (January 13, 1983) (referring to
proposed amendments that were prepared in August of 1982).
226
Letter of William LaFuze to Professor Richard F. Dole (December 1, 1982).
227
Letter of William LaFuze to Officer of the Governor of the State of Montana
(September 19, 1983).
228
Letter of Richard F. Dole to John McCabe (February 23, 1984) (enclosing
memorandum regarding "Desirable Amendments to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act");
Memorandum to NCCUSL Committee on Uniform Trade Secret Act from John McCabe
(June 28, 1984); Letter of Richard F. Dole to Jon McCabe (June 20, 1984) (enclosing
proposed amendment as approved by Mr. LaFuze in his personal capacity).
Amendments to Uniform Trade Secrets, Principal Policy Statement, at 1-2
229
(July 1985).
230
Id. at 2 (based upon the holding in University Computing Co. v. LykesYoungstown Corp. 504 F.2d 518, 535 (5th Cir. 1974)); see Transcript of Proceedings, 8th
Session, Uniform Trade Secrets, supra note 155, at 18-19.
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as an alternative to the grant of injunctive relief by stating that they can only
be granted in "exceptional cases." 23 1 Proceedings from the NCCUSL indicate
the following:
The American Bar Association was concerned about limiting
damages in [cases of good-faith misappropriation] and
allowing the court discretion to not allow damages under
those circumstances. And they wanted to spell it out so that
when you have your good faith misappropriation, damages
are not something to which the plaintiff is automatically
entitled.232
Significantly, because § 1(2) of the UTSA was understood to confer
immunity upon a large group of potential defendants (so-called "good-faith
misappropriators"), it was deemed unnecessary to detail in §§ 2 and 3 the
extent to which equitable and monetary relief should be limited because of
good-faith reliance.2 33
V. THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
COMMON LAW DOCTRINES AND STATUTORY ENACTMENTS
Once adopted by NCCUSL, uniform laws must be enacted into law
by the legislatures of individual states. Because this process takes time, the
switch from the Restatement First view of trade secrets to the UTSA view
was not immediate. Although five states quickly adopted the UTSA so that it
went into effect in those states in 1981, it was not until September 2, 1988,
when Alaska became the twenty-sixth state to enact the UTSA, that the
UTSA replaced the Restatement First as the predominant body of law
governing trade secrets in the United States.234 Unfortunately, little notice of
this milestone was made by courts and commentators of the time, and many
attorneys and judges continue to rely upon the Restatement First version of
trade secret law as if it is gospel. 2 35 This not only results in the application of
the incorrect body of law, but also gives undue credit to the Restatement
series that is, at best, only secondary authority of applicable law. It also fails
to recognize that the Restatement (Second) of Torts excluded all sections
concerning unfair competition and that the trade secret provisions of the
Restatement First were subsequently replaced in 1998 by sections of the

231

(July 1985).
at 25.

Amendments to Uniform Trade Secrets, Principal Policy Statement, at 2-3

232

Transcript of Proceedings, 8th Session, Uniform Trade Secrets, supra note 155,

233

Id. at 3; see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT

§

1(2)(ii)(C) (1985) (demonstrating that

a good-faith misappropriator is a person who does not know or have reason to know that the
information is a trade secret or that it was misappropriated).
234
See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50,
910-45 (2010).
235 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. 236
The Restatement series was and is an explication of applicable law
as divined by members of the American Law Institute (ALI), consisting of a
collection of judges, academics, and practitioners.237 The purpose of the
Restatement was (and is) not to codify the law, but rather to clarify and
simplify the law by providing an easily-accessible and clear statement of
what the members of the ALI thought was the majority view of the states on
various points of law.238 As explained by an early Director of the ALI:
Although the meaning of a case and the extent of its
authority was often in dispute the rule that the Restatement
should be prepared in light of case authority has been
adhered to. The Restatement does represent the considered
opinion of those constructing it of the way in which the law
would be decided in the light of decisions by the courts.239
In many instances, the drafters of the Restatement First did not have
much to rely upon in trying to predict how courts would decide various legal
issues. According to a study conducted by the ALI in the 1940s, "the
percentage of blanks [meaning the absence of applicable case authority] runs
in many States between fifty and seventy-four percent and even in States like
Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania there is a substantial number of
sections of the Restatement not covered by local case law."240 This
undoubtedly explains why some provisions of the Restatement First series
are more detailed than others. The more common law that existed on a
subject, the more "meat" the drafters had to work with in trying to explain
the better-reasoned law. Where there was not much case law on a topic-as
was the case with trade secret law circa 1939-then the provisions of the
Restatement First on those topics necessarily had to be more general in order
to avoid creating law.
The lack of applicable authority and the generality of the
Restatement First provisions on trade secret law are revealed by both the
structure and content of those provisions. The principal import of §§ 757
through 759 of the Restatement First is to identify the nature of the
wrongdoing. No effort was made in those provisions to provide details
concerning the meaning of any terminology used therein, let alone applicable
remedies or defenses. Rather, such details were left to be worked out by the
courts of each state in accordance with common law tradition. If and when
236

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
237 William Draper Lewis, History

Division Nine, Intro. Note, at 1 (1979);

§§ 39-45 (1998).

of the American Law Institute and the First

Restatement ofthe Law, in RESTATEMENT INTHE COURTS (Permanent ed., 1932-1944).

238 Id. at 19 (explaining that although the Restatement is expressed
in the form of a
code "there never has been any desire to give them statutory authority." Rather, "[the
Restatement] is designed to help preserve not to change the common system of expressing law
and adapting it to changing conditions in a changing world").
239 Id.at8.
240 Id. at 20.
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sufficient case authority developed on such issues, the Restatement First
would be revised and amended to reflect the subsequent common law
development of the law, as actually occurred with the adoption of the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.2 4' Moreover, although many
provisions of the Restatement First included commentary, the commentary
was not formally sanctioned by the ALI and, at best, constitutes the
individual opinion of the person(s) who drafted it.2 4 2 As with the textual
provisions of the Restatement First, if an issue of law developed in a manner
that was inconsistent with the commentary, then the law as developed should
prevail.
In contrast to the Restatement series, the purpose of the uniform law
process is not merely to restate existing law, but to make and codify the law.
As noted in a history of NCCUSL, in 1837 Justice Joseph Story explained
the purpose and benefits of uniform laws this way:
One great advantage, therefore, of a code, an advantage
which in a practical view can scarcely be over-estimated, is
that it supersedes the necessity, in ordinary cases at least, of
very elaborate researches into other books; and indeed, it
often supersedes in all cases, but those of rare and
extraordinary occurrence, the necessity of consulting an
immense mass of learned collections and digests of
243
antecedent decisions.
Thus, as a body of law, the UTSA-particularly as codified in each of the
forty-seven jurisdictions that have adopted it-has a different status than the
Restatement series. Whereas the Restatement series is secondary authority of
what the law is, the UTSA is primary authority. As a matter of statutory
interpretation, therefore, the first place that courts in UTSA jurisdictions
should look to understand trade secret law is the language of the UTSA
itself. To the extent that the language of the UTSA is unclear or incomplete,
then various methods of statutory interpretation can be used in an attempt to
apply the statute correctly, often depending upon the interpretative model
preferred by a given judge. 24
While debate rages about whether, and to what extent, it is

241

Id. at 21 ("Any subject in the Restatement when published represents the

present law. But, in a short time it here and there ceases to be the law."); see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45.

See generally Lewis, supranote 237.
WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, A CENTURY OF SERVICE, A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS 13 (West 1991).
244 See generally FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY
242
243

INTERPRETATION (2009) (discussing the textualism, legislative history, canons, and
pragmatism models of statutory interpretation). See also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing the pragmatism view); ANTONIN SCALIA,
COMMON-LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL
COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, IN A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (arguing the textualism view).
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appropriate for judges to consult legislative history to determine the meaning
of a statute, the drafting history of the UTSA is as relevant, if not more
relevant, than the Restatement series for understanding the current state of
trade secret law.245 In the case of the trade secret provisions of the
Restatement First, the case-by-case and fact-specific findings of various
common law courts circa 1939 is replaced with a recitation of law that was
the product of years of study and was updated to reflect intervening legal
developments, particularly with respects to Sears/Compco and its progeny. In
the case of the trade secret provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, which were based upon the UTSA, the drafting history of the
UTSA provides more direct evidence of the purpose and intent of the UTSA.
As the foregoing history of the UTSA reveals, the intent of the
UTSA was to supplement the common law in some respects and change it in
others. Indeed, this is one of the reasons the practicing bar advocated for the
adoption of the UTSA in the first place.246 The practicing bar was not happy
with the pace and path of development of the common law of trade secrets
and decided to speed up and refine that process by adopting a uniform law.247
Because many of the trade secret principles that had been fashioned by
common law courts differed from state to state, the drafters of the UTSA
endeavored to identify what they considered the better-reasoned principles of
trade secret law so that they could be codified in the UTSA. In the process,
they rejected a number of common law principles that led to uncertainty and
lack of clarity or that would have resulted in overly-broad protection for
business information. In particular, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Kewanee, the UTSA was drafted to ensure that the scope of state
trade secret law was limited so as not to interfere with federal patent policies.
Even if the history of the UTSA did not reveal a clear intent to
change trade secret law, the mere fact that trade secret principles were
codified in state laws should have changed the trajectory of and reference
points for the future development and application of trade secret law. This is
due to the fundamental difference between the common law development of
the law and statutory law. The codification of trade secret law into a statute
had the effect of limiting the further common law development of trade
secret within the confines of the statute itself. Rather than having the
freedom to consider general principles of equity and fairness-along with
precedents as described in the Restatement First and elsewhere-to
determine whether and how to give relief to trade secret claimants, judges in
UTSA states are required to read and interpret a statute. Justice Scalia
artfully explained the effect of a statute on the common law this way: "All of
this [common law development of the law] would be an unqualified good,
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44, 45 and accompanying text.
247 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. See also MILGRIM & BENSON, supra
note 20, at § 101 ("[The UTSA] largely codified common law but added a few features, such
as possible statutory increase of damages and discretionary attorneys fees.").
245

246
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were it not for a trend in government that has developed in recent centuries,

called democracy." 24 8
The point is that where a statute defines the requirements and
parameters of a tort, judges cannot substitute their view of applicable law for
that of state legislators, even if their view finds widespread support in the
common law. Rather, in the same way that case precedent can be overruled
by courts, courts should consider the extent to which a statute overrules case
precedent.
The difference between common law and a statute is perhaps best
seen in the case of trade secret law when one examines the competing
definitions of a trade secret under the UTSA and the Restatement First. The
UTSA definition of a trade secret is very exact and detailed. To be
recognized as a trade secret under the UTSA, information must: (1) be secret
(i.e., not generally known or readily ascertainable); (2) derive independent
economic value from being secret; and (3) be the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy. If a plaintiff in a
trade secret case cannot prove any one of these facts, then he or she does not
own a trade secret and cannot bring a successful claim for trade secret
misappropriation. In contrast, the Restatement First definition of protectable
information is less exacting and more amorphous. This is because, in keeping
with the role of a Restatement, the Restatement First is a compilation of
factors that different common law courts identified when considering the
basic question whether a trade secret claimant's information deserved
protection. According to the drafters of the UTSA, however, this approach
proved unpredictable and, in some cases, resulted in the over-protection of
information. 24 9 Thus, whereas common law courts applying the Restatement
First factors had leeway to rely on the existence of one or more of the six
listed factors, judges applying the UTSA must focus on the three
requirements of a trade secret under the UTSA.
Another example of how the UTSA changed the common law
trajectory of trade secret law is in the area of remedies. Although some
courts in some states had awarded the types of remedies that are set forth in
the UTSA before the UTSA was adopted, such remedies were not
universally recognized. Thus, deserving plaintiffs in trade secret cases often
struggled to prove entitlement to injunctive relief or an award of damages.
The remedies provisions of the UTSA had the salutary effect of eliminating
fights about the availability of remedies so that courts could focus their
attention on the merits of the underlying case. This, of course, was a boon to
trade secret claimants. However, at the same time the UTSA made it easier
for trade secret claimants to prevail by eliminating uncertainty about
available remedies, it also made it more difficult to establish a meritorious
case by more clearly defining the essential elements of a cause of action.
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Under the UTSA, any uncertainty about whether a trade secret claimant must
prove both the existence of a trade secret and misappropriation has been
eliminated.
As a whole, the UTSA attempts to strike the classic balance between
free competition on one hand and the prevention of unfair competition on the
other. Thus, to ignore any provision of the UTSA in favor of common law
principles as expressed in the Restatement First puts this balance at risk. This
is not to say that there is no role for courts to play in the interpretation and
application of the UTSA. Although the UTSA filled many of the gaps in
trade secret law that were not settled by common law courts, it left places
where some discretion and flexibility is allowed. The freedom to determine
what constitutes "reasonable efforts" is one obvious example. Courts are also
allowed to add to the illustrative lists of improper and proper means.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of the UTSA reveals the promise of the uniform law
making process. Over the course of more than twelve years, a group of
dedicated judges, academics, and practicing lawyers carefully studied the
state of trade secret law circa 1970 and determined that the pace and course
of its evolution could be improved with the adoption of a uniform law.
Although the initial impetus behind the project was a desire to solve the
Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze, ultimately the drafters of the UTSA saw an
opportunity to improve trade secret law in a number of ways. Because the
individuals who were involved in the process had a range of perspectives on
the topic-some favoring the needs of trade secret owners and others
favoring the needs of the public or the perspectives of defendants and third
parties-and no apparent agenda other than good policy making, the UTSA
reflects the important balance that, in theory, all intellectual property laws
seek to achieve: a balance between IP protection on one hand and free
competition on the other. As a result, although the careful application of the
UTSA may result in the inability of a business to protect information that it
deems valuable, that is by design. Pursuant to the well-established policy of
the United States, free competition and the dissemination of information is
the rule, intellectual property protection is the exception. It is only when a
business's information meets the carefully developed requirements of the
UTSA that it should be protected.

